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This paper assesses the extent to which debt overhang 
poses a constraint to economic activity in Emerging 
Europe, as the region emerges from the recent financial 
and economic crisis. At the macroeconomic level, it 
finds that the external imbalance problem for Emerging 
Europe has been in most cases more one of flows (high 
current account deficits in the pre-crisis years) rather 
than large stocks of external debt. A high reliance on 
equity funding means that net external debt is far lower 
than net external liabilities. Domestic balance sheets 
have expanded quite rapidly but sector liabilities remain 
relatively low compared with advanced economies. With 
the important exception of Hungary, public debt levels 
also remain relatively low in Emerging Europe. 
This paper is a product of the Office of the Chief Economist, Europe and Central Asia Region. It is part of a larger effort by 
the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around 
the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at martin.brown@unisg.ch (University of St. Gallen) and plane@tcd.ie (IIIS, Trinity College Dublin and CEPR).  
At the microeconomic level, the potential for debt 
overhang in the corporate sector is limited to a few 
countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia. 
Due to the low incidence of household debt, hardly any 
country, except Estonia, seems to face a threat of debt 
overhang in the household sector. The strong increase 
in non-performing loans compared with pre-crisis bank 
profitability suggests that debt overhang in the banking 
sector is a threat in Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Georgia, and Albania. Financial integration of Emerging 
Europe seems to have contributed to the transmission of 
the crisis to the region. At the same time, this integration 
is helping the region in managing the crisis by concerted 
actions of the major players. 
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Debt Overhang in Emerging Europe?
1 
 
1.  Introduction 
The aim of this background paper is to assess the extent to which debt overhang poses a 
constraint  to  economic  activity  in  Emerging  Europe,  as  the  region  emerges  from  the  recent 
financial and economic crisis.  The analysis covers the new member states of the EU (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia)  candidate  and  potential  candidates  of  the  EU  (Albania,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey) and Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine).  
We  take  a  broad  view  of  debt  overhang,  analyzing  both  its  macroeconomic  and 
microeconomic  dimensions.    At  the  macroeconomic  level,  we  examine  how  external  and 
domestic sectoral balance sheets developed prior to and during the crisis.  At the microeconomic 
level, we assess the distribution of debt across firms and households at the outset and during the 
crisis.  We further examine the loan losses suffered by the banking sector during the crisis and 
how this may impact on their future lending.  
In relation to our macroeconomic analysis, we find that the external imbalance problem 
for Emerging Europe has been in most cases more one of flows (high current account deficits in 
the pre-crisis years) rather than large stocks of external debt.  A high reliance on equity funding 
means that net  external debt is far lower than net external liabilities.  In any event, current 
account deficits have narrowed quite rapidly in most countries over 2008-2010.  In relation to 
domestic sectoral balance sheets, these have expanded quite rapidly but sectoral liabilities remain 
relatively low compared to advanced economies.  However, the rapid expansion in credit does 
suggest that non-performing loans could be problematic, due to deterioration in loan quality 
during intense credit booms.   Finally, with the important exception of Hungary, public debt 
levels remain relatively low in Emerging Europe.  So long as the debts of other sectors are not 
socialized, the risk of sovereign debt crises in these countries seems low compared to many 
advanced economies. 
At the microeconomic level, we first examine whether debt overhang in the enterprise 
sector may constrain future activity in the region.  Using data from the EBRD 2009 Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) we identify the share and type of 
firms which are highly leveraged in each country and assess what this may imply for corporate 
investment going forward out of the crisis.  Comparing the share of highly leveraged firms by 
country to GDP contraction during the crisis we find that debt overhang is likely to  pose a 
general threat to firm activity in only a limited number of the more advanced countries: Latvia, 
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Lithuania,  Estonia,  and  Slovenia.    Leverage  levels  among  export-orientated  firms  and  the 
widespread contraction of export income in the region, suggests, however, that debt overhang in 
the tradable sector may be an issue for a broader set of countries: Latvia, Lithuania Estonia, 
Slovenia, Macedonia,  Bosnia, Turkey, the Slovak Republic, Serbia, the Czech Republic and 
Croatia.    Finally,  our  firm-level  analysis  suggests  that  despite  sharp  depreciations  in  many 
countries during the crisis, unhedged foreign currency borrowing by firms does not seem to be a 
source of debt overhang.  The countries with a high incidence of unhedged FX loans experienced 
only minor depreciations during the crisis. 
We next examine the potential for debt overhang in the household sector by country 
using data from the 2010 EBRD Life in Transition Survey (LITS).  We find that mortgage debt 
seems to have had a significant adverse impact on household consumption and investment during 
the crisis.  However, due to the low incidence of mortgage debt in the region hardly any country, 
except Estonia, seems to face a threat of debt overhang.  The use of credit cards is much more 
widespread in the region than mortgage debt.  However, credit card use has had a negligible 
effect on household income and investment during the crisis.  It is unlikely therefore that credit 
card debt may jeopardize future economic activity in the region.  Our household-level analysis 
further suggests that FX mortgages hardly pose a threat to future household consumption and 
investment.  Only a minor fraction of households in the region are exposed to foreign currency 
mortgages.    Moreover  those  countries  in  which  FX  mortgages  are  most  prevalent  did  not 
experience major exchange rate shocks during the crisis. 
We  also  assess  the  potential  for  debt  overhang  in  the  banking  sector  due  to  the 
significant loan losses incurred in many countries of the region during the crisis.  The strong 
increase in non-performing loans (NPL) compared to pre-crisis bank profitability suggests that 
debt overhang in the banking sector is a threat in Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary as well as 
in Georgia and Albania.  In the countries that face the most severe NPL problems, the share of 
private credit extended to firms (60%) and households (40%) is similar to the sample average.  
This suggests that debt overhang in the banking sector of these countries is likely to affect both 
sectors, with firms slightly more affected than households.  We further assess the role of foreign 
banks in mitigating or exacerbating the effects of the crisis in the region.  A review of the recent 
evidence  suggests  that  the  financial  integration  of  Emerging  Europe  has  contributed  to  the 
transmission of a crisis that had emerged unrelated to the local economic conditions.  At the 
same time, this integration helped the region in managing the crisis by concerted actions of the 
major players (Vienna Initiative, IMF and EU stabilizing programs). 
In the final part of the paper, we examine the policy response in emerging Europe, both in 
terms of pre-crisis policies and also the policy response during the crisis.  We review the lessons 
from previous crises in terms of dealing with debt overhang issues and offer a brief assessment 
of current policy measures in emerging Europe.  
We find that authorities in most countries have focused on policy measures to curb FX 
lending  and  cushion  the  effects  of  exchange  rate  depreciations  on  existing  FX  borrowers, 
especially in the household sector.  Our analysis suggests that these will have little effect on 
aggregate  investment  and  consumption  in  the  private  sector.    While  FX  lending  may  be  a 
pressing issue for financial stability, the low levels of unhedged FX borrowing by enterprises and 
the low incidence of mortgage borrowing among households suggests that this can hardly affect 
aggregate output. 4 
 
We discuss recent measures in selected countries (e.g. Latvia and Hungary) to shift the 
burden of debt from households to banks.  Our assessment is that these measures may be 
counterproductive in view of future economic growth: the marginal debt levels of households in 
the  region  suggests  that  over-indebtedness  will  hardly  constrain  economic  activity  in  the 
household sector, while debt overhang in the banking sector seems to already pose a greater 
threat.  
Finally  we  discuss  whether  authorities  in  the  region  should  follow  the  example  of 
industrialized countries in the recent crisis and East Asian countries at the end of the 1990s by 
using public funds to take “toxic” assets off banks’ balance sheets.  Our view is that such 
measures may not be necessary: those countries in the region that have experienced substantial 
losses in the banking sector are also characterized by a dominance of foreign-owned banks.  
These banks have shown the ability and willingness to support their subsidiaries in Emerging 
Europe even in times when they were facing substantial challenges in their home markets.  Also, 
it seems both politically and economically infeasible that authorities in Emerging Europe could 
use taxpayer funds to subsidize the activities of a predominantly foreign-owned banking sector. 
The structure of the rest of this paper is as follows.  We provide a brief overview of the 
debt overhang literature in Section 2.  In Section 3, we describe the evolution of the external 
balance sheets of emerging Europe over the last decade, differentiating between external debt 
and external equity positions. In addition, we analyze the dynamics of public debt and private-
sector debts, plus sectoral balance sheets.  We turn to micro-level evidence in Section 4, in which 
we examine debt levels at the level of firms, households and banks.  We conclude with our 
policy analysis in Section 5. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
The  broad  scope  of  our  analysis  is  inspired  by  the  multifaceted  discussion  of  debt 
overhang in the microeconomic and macroeconomic literature.  The corporate finance literature 
on debt overhang reaches back to Myers (1977), who demonstrated that the existing level of debt 
can alter the investment decisions of firms. In his framework, debt overhang refers to a situation 
where the expected payoff to existing creditors is less than the face value of their claims on the 
firm.  In such a case, the firm must use part of the profits from new investments to pay off 
existing  creditors.    Shareholders  of  limited-liability  firms  will  not  internalize  this  positive 
“external”  effect  of  their  investment  activity  and  may  pass  up  profitable  investment 
opportunities. 
In  parallel,  a  narrow  definition  of  debt  overhang  in  the  household  sector  refers  to  a 
situation  where  over-indebted  households  forego  investments  in  home  improvement  (Melzer 
2010) or household supply of labor (Mulligan 2008).  In a broader sense, debt overhang can also 
refer to the negative impact of household debt on consumption levels, as in Olney (1999).  
Debt overhang in the banking sector has been put forward as the major reason for policy 
interventions to remove toxic assets from bank balance sheets and recapitalize banks during the 
recent  crisis  (Philippon  and  Schnabl,  2009).    In  analogy  to  corporate  debt  overhang,  debt 
overhang in the banking sector is viewed as a situation in which the scale of the debt liabilities of 5 
 
the banking sector (relative to the value of bank assets) distorts the lending decisions of the 
banking sector. 
In the context of sovereign debt, Krugman (1988) defines debt overhang as a situation in 
which “the expected present value of future country transfers is less than the current face value 
of its debt”.  This corresponds to the notion of a Debt Laffer Curve, by which total repayments 
decline beyond a threshold level of debt.  A Debt Laffer Curve effect exists if the outstanding 
level of debt distorts investment and labor supply decisions and/or adversely affects economic 
policies to such an extent that total repayments shrink. 
At a macroeconomic level, a common usage is to identify the existence of debt overhang 
if the outstanding level of debt is associated with a reduction in the rate of economic growth (see 
Manzano and Rigobon 2001, Cordella et al 2005, Budina et al 2007 and Imbs and Ranciere 
2008, among others).
2  Much of the initial literature focused on external debt, since the servicing 
of external debt has clear macroeconomic implications in terms of requiring a trade surplus in 
steady state.  Typically, this requires an economy to undergo a real exchange rate depreciation.   
In turn, this can aggravate the debt problem, due to the feedback between the real exchange rate 
and the real value of the debt burden. In addition, the external dimension is especially interesting, 
since it is well understood that the enforcement of cross -border debts (especially sovereign 
debts) is quite problematic. 
A large external debt generates an array of economic distortions.  The classic example is 
that high debt acts like a tax on investment, since an expansion in resources will largely be 
absorbed by increased payments to outstanding creditors (Krugman 1988, Sachs 1 989, among 
others).  In similar vein, the incentive for a government to deliver growth -friendly policies is 
weakened, if domestic residents enjoy only a limited gain from extra output.  In addition, a high 
outstanding level of debt increases fragility in f unding markets (Diwan and Rodrik 1992).  For 
instance, the higher level of rollover risk that is associated with a large outstanding stock of debt 
means that new lenders may be unwilling to provide funds due to the risk of market disruptions. 
In turn, the concept of debt overhang inspired many proposals for debt relief during the 
l980s (Dooley 1986, Fischer 1989, Bulow and Rogoff 1989, amongst many others).  In part, the 
rationale for policy intervention was to coordinate across individual creditors, since  the “free 
rider”  problem  means  that  individual  creditors  have  an  incentive  to  hold  out  for  maximum 
repayment.  In part, however, subsidies from international financial institutions were used to 
bridge  the  gap  between  the  minimum  repayments  required  by  creditors  and  the  maximum 
repayments that could be tolerated by debtors (Sachs 1989).  
The debt relief literature highlights that many different financial engineering solutions, 
with each allocating the costs of debt relief in different ways.  Accordingly, there are critical 
distributional issues in designing a debt resolution scheme, which can lead to prolonged delays in 
achieving agreement.  In addition to reductions in the net present value of debt, an additional 
mechanism  is  to  convert  debt  into  an  equity  claim  and/or  make  the  level  and  timing  of 
repayments contingent on the economic performance of the debtor.  Such risk-sharing schemes 
enable greater transfers to creditors if performance is good.  To avoid moral hazard problems, 
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such schemes are ideally based on exogenous factors, such as world interest rates or commodity 
prices (see Krugman 1988, among others). 
In  relation  to  net  external  liabilities,  there  has  been  a  major  shift  away  from  debt 
financing towards equity financing for emerging market and developing economies; conversely, 
many advanced economies have large net foreign debt liability positions that fund positive net 
foreign equity positions (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007a, Lane and Shambaugh 2010).   
In some respects, the debt overhang problem can be interpreted as a liability overhang 
problem, in the sense that total expected net outward transfers (whether debt payments or equity 
payments) may influence incentives.  Indeed, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) emphasize that a 
high equity component in external liabilities means that more of the upside from future economic 
growth accrues to foreign investors.  Moreover, to the extent that an equity return premium 
exists, the average level of outward transfers should be higher, the greater is the equity share in 
external liabilities.  However, in the other direction, equity-type liabilities are less risky than 
debt-type liabilities due to  the contingent  nature of  equity  returns.    In this  way,  an adverse 
macroeconomic shock can amplify the external debt burden but may be hedged in the case of 
foreign equity liabilities.  Accordingly, if tail risk is a major source of debt overhang, this is 
ameliorated  by  a  greater  role  for  equity-type  instruments  in  external  liabilities.    Finally,  an 
interesting special case relates to external debt that is intermediated via foreign-owned affiliates 
in the domestic banking system.  In this case, the risk of external debt is attenuated since the 
equity in the capital base of the foreign-owned domestic banks provides a buffer that can absorb 
losses in the event of a negative shock.  
The accumulated empirical evidence provides some support for the overhang hypothesis 
in relation to external debt. Cordella et al (2005) study 79 developing countries over 1970-2002 
and find external debt above 15%-30% is associated with lower growth performance for those 
countries with good institutions.
3  Imbs and Ranciere (2008) study 87 developing countries over 
1969-2002 and find a negative growth effect if the face value of external debt exceeds 60 percent 
of GDP (or if the present value of debt exceeds 40 percent of GDP).   Moreover, they identify 
some mechanisms by which debt overhang operates. In particular, they show that investm ent 
declines and the conduct of economic policy deteriorates in the debt overhang zone.   According 
to the authors, these results are mostly driven by countries with poor property rights and 
underdeveloped  financial  markets,  under  which  external  monitoring  of  borrowers  is  most 
difficult.
4 
Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2010)  study  the  relation  between  external  debt  and  growth 
performance for a group of twenty emerging market economies over  a 200-year period.  In 
bivariate statistical analysis, these authors find a threshold of 60 percent of GDP, with a lower 
growth rate observed for countries with higher external debt levels. 
However, all of these studies focus on developing country studies.   One reason is that 
there are no similar, long datasets on the external debts of advanced economies (partly due to the 
                                                 
3 These authors find that is no robust relation between debt and growth for countries with weak institutions. One 
possibility is that debt rescheduling is fully expected for such countries. 
4 Arsanalp and Henry (2004) provide related evidence using data on the impact of announcements of debt relief 
schemes on asset prices.  7 
 
lower incidence of default on external debt among high-income countries).  Accordingly, their 
relevance to advanced economies may be limited, in view of the greater degree of financial 
development and other structural differences.  Moreover, the phenomenon of significant foreign 
equity  liabilities  is  relatively  recent  (only  growing  rapidly  since  the  early  2000s),  such  that 
studies  concerning  external  debt  do  not  necessarily  carry  over  to  total  external  liabilities.  
Finally, these studies consider gross external debt.  While foreign debt assets for these types of 
countries might have been relatively small in earlier periods, the growth in reserve positions over 
the last decade means that there is a large divergence between gross external debt liabilities and 
net external debt liabilities for many countries. 
As noted above, the debt overhang concept can also apply at the sectoral level and at the 
level of individual banks, firms and households in addition to the external dimension.  There is a 
growing literature that shows that high public debts are associated with lower output growth 
(Checherita and Rother 2010, Kumar and Woo 2010, Reinhart and Rogoff 2010).  
Kumar and Woo (2010) study a panel of 38 advanced and emerging economies over 1970 
to 2007.  These authors find that public debt ratios above 90 percent are associated with lower 
subsequent output growth, with the growth penalty substantially larger for emerging markets 
than for advanced economies.  In particular, these authors estimate that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the debt ratio is associated with a growth slowdown of 0.15-0.2 percent in advanced 
economies  but  0.3-0.4  percent  in  emerging  economies.    Moreover,  they  find  that  reduced 
investment is a key driver of the deterioration in growth performance.  
In a study of euro area member countries over 1970-2009, Checherita and Rother (2010) 
also find a negative growth threshold of around 90-100 percent for the debt ratio.  However, 
these authors caution that the lower-bound confidence interval of 70-80 percent calls for greater 
prudential policies at lower debt levels.  In terms of mechanics, these authors find that high 
public debt adversely affects growth through several channels, including reductions in private 
saving and TFP growth.  In a study of forty-four countries over two hundred years, the statistical 
analysis of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) also suggests a 90 percent threshold ratio of public debt, 
beyond which growth performance deteriorates. 
It is important to emphasize that private-sector debt problems can induce a sovereign debt 
crisis.    Most  directly,  a  government  may  choose  to  take  over  private  liabilities,  either  for 
efficiency reasons or in response to political pressures.  In turn, the existence of an implicit fiscal 
backstop may lead to lower repayment discipline among private-sector creditors, especially if 
debt  problems  are  sufficiently  widespread  in  the  population  to  render  punishment  threats 
incredible (Arellano and Kocherlakota 2008).  A similar logic applies if banks are taken into 
public ownership and private-sector debtors believe that government-owned banks will take a 
softer  line  in  enforcing  repayment.    Accordingly,  governments  face  a  difficult  problem  in 
designing resolution schemes for private-sector debts, in view of such moral hazard problems. 
In relation to sectoral debt overhang, the literature on the output losses associated with 
banking crises is extensive (see Cerra and Saxena 2008,  Furceri and Mourougane 2009 and 
International  Monetary  Fund  2009  for  recent  studies).    There  is  also  some  evidence  that 
excessive  leverage  at  corporate  and  household  levels  may  also  damage  macroeconomic 
performance (Laeven and Laryea 2009, Laryea 2010).  8 
 
In summary, the research literature provides an array of theoretical mechanisms that can 
generate a debt overhang effect, at either aggregate or sectoral levels.  Moreover, the empirical 
evidence does suggest that excessively-high debt levels can weigh down on macroeconomic or 
sectoral economic performance.  However, the potential gains to any type of debt forgiveness 
program have to be set against the possible short-term and long-term costs of writing down debt 
levels.  In relation to the short-term costs, debt renegotiation costs can be substantial (both in 
terms of lost output and financial reputation), depending on the level of cooperation between 
creditors and debtors (see Panizza et al 2009 for a recent survey).  As indicated above, there is 
also the moral hazard risk by which the existence of a debt forgiveness program may reduce 
repayment discipline even among those that  would  meet  their commitments  under a stricter 
regime.  In relation to the longer term, the weakening of creditor rights in a debt forgiveness 
program may raise the long-term cost of capital (Shleifer 2003). 
Furthermore,  in  terms  of  quantitative  guidance,  the  empirical  literature  offers  only 
indicative evidence.  In particular, the bulk of the studies relate to lower-income countries, such 
that the guidance in terms of debt thresholds for advanced or upper middle income economies 
may be quite limited.  Moreover, the results are sensitive to sample selection and the choice of 
conditioning variables.  Accordingly, in what follows, we mainly focus on cross-country and 
cross-group comparisons rather than seeking to place each country on either side of a fixed 
threshold. 
 
3.  External and Domestic Balance Sheets 
3.1  External Balance Sheets 
In this section, we examine the evolution of the external balance sheets of emerging 
Europe.  A highly-negative net foreign asset position may signal sustainability problems.  In 
particular, if a substantial improvement in the net foreign asset position is required to ensure 
sustainability, this will typically require a turnaround in the trade balance.  In turn, this may 
induce substantial real exchange rate depreciation (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2004).  In addition, 
import  compression  may  be  achieved  through  a  contraction  in  domestic  demand,  such  that 
external  adjustment  may  be  associated  with  domestic  recessionary  forces.    The  social  and 
economic costs of this dynamic may tempt a country with large net external liabilities to look to 
debt restructuring or international financial assistance in order to smooth out the adjustment 
process. 
Table 3.1 shows the net  foreign asset  position for the individual emerging European 
countries for three years: 2002, 2007 and 2009.  There is a clear difference between the EU new 
member states and the other countries in terms of the growth in the net external position during 
the pre-crisis period.  In particular, there was a near doubling of the net external liabilities of the 
former group between 2002 and 2007, whereas there was only a marginal deterioration for the 
latter group.  Both groups have seen further deterioration between 2007 and 2009 but the gap 
between the two groups has closed slightly. 
 
Table 3.1a shows that the net foreign liability positions of the emerging European regions 
are much more negative than for emerging Asia and emerging Latin America.  The comparison 
with the Euro Periphery shows an important difference: whereas the expansion in net external 9 
 
liabilities between 2002 and 2007 was similar across the two areas, the net external liabilities of 
the Euro Periphery continued to grow rapidly after 2007, whereas emerging Europe has seen a 
much smaller deterioration during the crisis.  
Table 3.1. Net Foreign Assets, Percent of GDP  
   Country  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria  -30  -95  -117 
  Czech Republic  -18  -45  -47 
  Estonia  -60  -79  -84 
  Hungary  -74  -96  -129 
  Latvia  -44  -80  -87 
  Lithuania  -37  -60  -62 
  Poland  -38  -58  -66 
  Romania  -24  -50  -66 
  Slovak Republic  -27  -61  -73 
  Slovenia  -2  -25  -39 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  -14  -28  -50 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  -29  -36  -57 
  Croatia  -30  -103  -86 
  Macedonia, FYR  -40  -47  -66 
  Serbia  n/a  n/a  n/a 
  Turkey  -37  -49  -45 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  -64  -23  -48 
  Georgia  -64  -84  -121 
  Moldova  -93  -62  -76 
   Ukraine  -29  -23  -39 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Note: This table reports foreign asset 
minus foreign liabilities. 
 
Table 3.1a. Net Foreign Assets, Percent of GDP 
  Country  2002  2007  2009 
Euro Periphery   -48  -77  -102 
Emerging Latin America  -47  -24  -24 
Emerging Asia  -15  0  -10 
       
New Member States  -35  -65  -77 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  -30  -52  -61 
Eastern Partnership Countries  -63  -48  -71 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Note: These tables report foreign asset 
minus foreign liabilities. 
 
It might be argued that the debt component of the external balance sheet poses more 
problems than the equity component in relation to overhang issues.  Accordingly, we show the 
net debt and net equity positions in Table 3.2.  For the new member states, Table 3.2 shows 
sizeable growth in net debt liabilities between 2002 and 2007, from 2 percent of GDP to 18 
percent of GDP.  There has been further expansion during the crisis, rising to 27 percent of GDP 
in 2009.  Table 3.2 also shows that net equity liabilities are far greater than net debt liabilities for 
the new member states.  Moreover, the relative stability of net equity positions between 2007 and 
2009 also highlights the stabilizing role played by equity-type liabilities - the value of these 
liabilities naturally falls with a decline in performance in these economies.   
 
A similar message holds for the other countries. Indeed, net debt liabilities for this group 
actually fell between 2002 and 2007, before increasing during the crisis period.  Between 2002 
and 2007, these countries saw rapid growth in net equity liabilities.  Figure 3.1 shows the scatter 
of net equity versus net debt positions for 2009 for the whole sample of countries. 10 
 
Table 3.2. Net Debt and Equity IIP, Percent of GDP 
      Net Debt  Net Equity 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria  -8  0  -12  -23  -95  -105 
  Czech Republic  33  14  9  -51  -60  -56 
  Estonia  -4  -33  -37  -57  -47  -46 
  Hungary  -19  -44  -60  -56  -51  -68 
  Latvia  -14  -46  -46  -29  -34  -40 
  Lithuania  -8  -27  -33  -28  -34  -29 
  Poland  -12  -16  -26  -26  -42  -40 
  Romania  -6  -11  -21  -18  -39  -45 
  Slovak Republic  9  -3  -15  -36  -58  -58 
  Slovenia  11  -15  -28  -13  -10  -10 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  9  5  -7  -22  -33  -42 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  -17  -1  -18  -12  -35  -39 
  Croatia  -12  -29  -39  -18  -73  -47 
  Macedonia, FYR  -8  2  -9  -32  -49  -57 
  Serbia              
  Turkey  -30  -17  -19  -7  -31  -26 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  -36  4  -6  -29  -27  -42 
  Georgia  -38  -19  -34  -26  -65  -87 
  Moldova  -55  -20  -27  -38  -42  -49 
   Ukraine  -14  5  5  -15  -27  -45 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Note: This table reports net debt which is 
international debt assets plus foreign exchange reserves minus international debt liabilities, and net equity which is 
international equity assets minus international equity liabilities. 
. 
Table 3.2a compares the evolution of net debt and net equity for Emerging Europe to the 
Euro  Periphery,  Emerging  Latin  America  and  Emerging  Asia.    There  are  some  striking 
differences  across  these  regions.    While  emerging  economies  in  Latin  America  and  Asia 
accumulated positive net debt positions between 2002 and 2009, only the Eastern Partnership 
bloc  in  Europe  saw  a  reduction  in  net  debt  liabilities.    In  contrast,  the  growth  in  net  debt 
liabilities was most rapid for the Euro Periphery and the new member states.   
Table 3.2a. Net Debt and Equity IIP, Percent of GDP 
 Country 
  
Net Debt  Net Equity 
  
  
2002  2007  2009  2002  2007  2009 
Euro Periphery   29  -3  -20  -78  -73  -81 
Emerging Latin America  -23  3  7  -24  -27  -30 
Emerging Asia  0  27  35  -14  -27  -17 
             
New Member States  -2  -18  -27  -34  -47  -50 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  -12  -8  -18  -18  -44  -42 
Eastern Partnership Countries  -36  -8  -16  -27  -40  -55 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 
Note:  These  tables  report  net  debt  which  is  international  debt  assets  plus  foreign  exchange  reserves  minus 
international debt liabilities, and net equity which is international equity assets minus international equity liabilities. 
 
In relation to net equity positions, these were relatively stable for the Euro Periphery, 
Emerging Latin America and Emerging Asia, whereas net equity liabilities grew significantly for 
each region in Emerging Europe.  
We dig deeper into the net debt positions in Table 3.3.  In particular, we recognize that 
gross debt liabilities matter, in addition to the net position.  This is especially the case during 
periods of market turmoil, in which gross debt liability positions may have to be rolled over or 
redeemed, while not all types of gross debt assets might be fully liquid or available to net off 11 
 
against the liabilities.  In addition, it is helpful to keep track of the scale of foreign reserve assets, 
since these can provide a useful  source of foreign-currency liquidity in the event  of market 
disruption. 
Figure 3.1. Net Foreign Debt and Net Foreign Equity Positions, 2009, % GDP 
 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Note: This table reports net debt which is 
international debt assets plus foreign exchange reserves minus international debt liabilities, and net equity which is 
international equity assets minus international equity liabilities. 
 
Table 3.3. Gross Debt and Foreign Reserves, Percent of GDP 
      Gross Debt  Foreign Exchange Reserves 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria  69  68  73  28  42  36 
  Czech Republic  29  38  41  31  20  22 
  Estonia  49  96  106  14  15  21 
  Hungary  50  93  119  15  17  34 
  Latvia  67  125  145  13  19  26 
  Lithuania  37  69  78  17  19  17 
  Poland  37  44  52  14  15  18 
  Romania  32  40  58  13  22  26 
  Slovak Republic  47  45  60  36  24  1 
  Slovenia  48  96  108  30  2  2 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  25  27  34  19  20  19 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  54  50  54  20  30  19 
  Croatia  54  73  80  22  23  22 
  Macedonia, FYR  44  43  46  19  26  22 
  Serbia              
  Turkey  54  41  44  12  11  12 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  64  26  55  17  18  23 
  Georgia  54  39  61  6  13  20 
  Moldova  99  64  69  16  30  27 
   Ukraine  51  54  84  10  22  22 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Note: This table reports international debt 
liabilities as a percentage of GDP and foreign exchange reserves. 
 
In relation to the new member states, Table 3.3 shows that the Baltic States and Hungary 
saw a very rapid expansion in gross debt liabilities between 2002 and 2007 but that the scale of 12 
 
gross  debt  liabilities  was  much  smaller  for  the  other  countries.    An  important  exception  is 
Slovenia, which shows gross debt levels that are more similar to other higher-income members 
of the euro area.  For the new member states, foreign reserve assets are quite substantial (with the 
exceptions of those who had joined the euro area during this period), providing a buffer against 
foreign-currency shortages. 
Turning  to  the  group  of  other  countries,  gross  debt  liabilities  actually  fell  for  these 
countries between 2002 and 2007.  However, there was some deterioration between 2007 and 
2009 for most of these countries, while Ukraine saw a very large jump in gross debt liabilities 
(relative to GDP).  In terms of foreign reserve assets, these countries look very similar to the new 
member states in maintaining foreign reserve assets at around 20 percent of GDP. 
Table 3.3a shows the comparative cross-regional data.  All emerging regions show gross 
external debt liabilities that are far below the levels of the Euro Periphery, reflecting a much 
lower degree of cross-border financial integration.  However, across the emerging regions, it is 
striking that Latin America and Asia witnessed sizeable declines in gross debt liabilities in the 
2002-09 period, while the new member states underwent a doubling in gross debt liabilities. 
Table 3.3a. Gross Debt and Foreign Reserves, Percent of GDP 
  Gross Debt  Foreign Exchange Reserves 
Country  2002  2007  2009  2002  2007  2009 
Euro Periphery   184  315  370  6  0  1 
Emerging Latin America  61  34  32  10  13  15 
Emerging Asia  46  37  36  29  36  43 
              New Member States  46  71  84  21  20  20 
Candidates and Potential 
Candidates 
46  47  51  18  22  19 
Eastern Partnership Countries  67  46  67  12  21  23 
Source: Updated EWN dataset based on Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Note: These tables report international 
debt liabilities and foreign exchange reserves. 
 
Tables 3.4a to 3.4g provide further insight into the gross external debt positions of these 
countries.  Table 3.4a shows total cross-border loans from BIS-reporting banks.  Bank loans 
grew very rapidly between 2002 and 2007, especially for the Baltic States.  Since 2007, there has 
been a degree of deleveraging for many countries.  Table 3.4b isolates the cross-border loans 
made  to  non-banks:  these  are  only  a  small  proportion  of  total  cross-border  loans  for  most 
countries.  Rather,  cross-border  loans  are  typically  intermediated  via  the  domestic  banking 
system. 
 
In  relation  to  foreign  reserves,  the  Euro  Periphery  held  very  low  levels  of  foreign 
reserves, in line with membership of a common currency area.  While Emerging Europe holds 
more foreign reserves than Emerging Latin America as a ratio to GDP, the level is far below 
Emerging Asia.  While the Eastern Partnership countries did increase reserve levels between 
2002 and 2009, this was not the case for the other regions in Emerging Europe, despite the rapid 
growth in gross external debt liabilities. 
 
Table 3.4c reports the stock of international debt securities issued by each country. It 
shows that this is not a major source of external debt financing, with the exceptions of Hungary, 
Lithuania and Slovenia.  As is shown in Table 3.4d, it is striking that the non-banks are the 13 
 
dominant issuers of international debt securities, which is in contrast to the more central role 
played by bank bonds in some advanced economies. 
Table 3.4a. Loans from Banks, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  6  29  40  36 
  Czech Republic  14  18  15  14 
  Estonia  15  60  68  55 
  Hungary  15  32  52  50 
  Latvia  9  67  71  64 
  Lithuania  6  39  43  34 
  Poland  8  14  18  19 
  Romania  6  26  34  31 
  Slovakia  10  20  12  14 
  Slovenia  17  60  54  51 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  1  3  6  7 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  7  23  24  20 
  Croatia  22  49  58  54 
  Macedonia, FYR 
  Serbia         
  Turkey  14  17  19  16 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  1  2  3  3 
  Georgia  5  4  4  3 
  Moldova  4  9  9  6 
   Ukraine  2  16  18  14 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports cross-border loans from BIS banks. 
 
Table 3.4b. Loans from Banks to Nonbanks, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  2  16  20  20 
  Czech Republic  6  9  9  8 
  Estonia  7  14  12  11 
  Hungary  6  13  23  21 
  Latvia  2  13  15  15 
  Lithuania  3  9  9  6 
  Poland  4  6  7  7 
  Romania  5  10  15  13 
  Slovakia  6  7  9  9 
  Slovenia  9  19  22  23 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  0  1  5  6 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  6  6  8  7 
  Croatia  10  30  34  34 
  Macedonia, FYR     
  Serbia         
  Turkey  11  12  13  10 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  0  1  2  1 
  Georgia  3  1  2  3 
  Moldova  2  2  2  2 
   Ukraine  1  5  6  5 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports cross-border loans from BIS banks to nonbanks. 
 
Table 3.4e shows the consolidated liabilities to BIS-reporting banks.  The consolidated 
data take into account local lending by the domestic affiliates of foreign-owned banks, while 
netting out any cross-border loans by the foreign affiliates of domestically-owned banks.  Taken 
in tandem with the locational data reported in Table 3.4f, these data show that local lending by 
foreign-owned affiliates are a substantial component of the total exposure of foreign banks in 
these countries.  As indicated in Section 2, a high level of foreign ownership in the banking 14 
 
system reduces the risk associated with high external or local debt, since there is a foreign equity 
buffer to absorb losses in the event of a banking crisis.  However, in the other direction, it is also 
possible that foreign-owned banks are more vulnerable to external credit crises that may induce 
parent banks to pull back from all locations.  These issues are explored further section 4.3. 
 
Table 3.4c. International Debt Securities, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  26  5  5  4 
  Czech Republic  3  5  10  12 
  Estonia  9  8  3  3 
  Hungary  16  25  30  28 
  Latvia  5  5  6  6 
  Lithuania  11  15  22  29 
  Poland  4  10  12  13 
  Romania  6  3  3  3 
  Slovakia  12  7  9  10 
  Slovenia  10  8  29  36 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  6  2  2  2 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  0  0     
  Croatia  20  13  12  13 
  Macedonia, FYR   
  Serbia         
  Turkey  10  6  7  6 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia         
  Georgia  0  2  6  8 
  Moldova  0  0  0  0 
   Ukraine  6  9  10  9 
Source: World Bank, Joint External Debt Hub. Note: This table reports international debt securities, all maturities. 
 
 
Table 3.4d. International Debt Securities, Nonbanks, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  26  5  5  4 
  Czech Republic  1  4  9  11 
  Estonia  5  2  3  3 
  Hungary  15  19  24  23 
  Latvia  5  3  4  5 
  Lithuania  11  15  22  29 
  Poland  4  10  12  13 
  Romania  6  2  2  3 
  Slovakia  12  7  9  10 
  Slovenia  9  7  22  29 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  6  2  2  2 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina     
  Croatia  19  9  10  11 
  Macedonia, FYR 
  Serbia         
  Turkey  10  6  7  6 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia         
  Georgia  0  0  5  7 
  Moldova  0  0  0  0 
   Ukraine  6  6  7  7 
Source: World Bank, Joint External Debt Hub. Note: This table reports international debt securities, nonbanks. 
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Table 3.4e. Liabilities to Banks, Consolidated, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  13  55  67  60 
  Czech Republic  19  26  21  19 
  Estonia  74  111  120  115 
  Hungary  35  69  80  74 
  Latvia  20  90  105  100 
  Lithuania  19  53  72  62 
  Poland  16  25  31  31 
  Romania  10  54  49  46 
  Slovakia  21  38  20  16 
  Slovenia  24  57  44  42 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  4  19  27  28 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  10  40  29  27 
  Croatia  44  103  79  86 
  Macedonia, FYR 
  Serbia         
  Turkey  14  18  18  15 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  1  3  5  6 
  Georgia  6  4  8  11 
  Moldova  6  6  13  10 
   Ukraine  2  22  19  17 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports liabilities to BIS banks, consolidated total. 
 
Table 3.4f. Liabilities to Banks, Locational, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  12  40  49  46 
  Czech Republic  18  28  24  23 
  Estonia  27  85  92  81 
  Hungary  28  56  72  69 
  Latvia  13  71  77  71 
  Lithuania  11  49  54  46 
  Poland  13  26  28  29 
  Romania  7  33  39  36 
  Slovakia  15  29  21  23 
  Slovenia  23  69  65  64 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  4  6  11  11 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  8  29  29  24 
  Croatia  28  73  72  67 
  Macedonia, FYR         
  Serbia         
  Turkey  16  21  22  20 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  1  2  4  3 
  Georgia  5  4  4  5 
  Moldova  4  11  10  8 
   Ukraine  2  20  22  17 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports liabilities to BIS banks, locational total. 
 
Finally, Table 3.4g shows that the importance of official multilateral lending has grown 
since the onset of the crisis.  The biggest growth during the crisis has been concentrated on 
Latvia, Hungary, Romania and the Ukraine. 
Tables  3.4h  to  3.4m  provide  analogous  data  to  Tables  3.4a  to  3.4g  but  on  an  inter-
regional comparative basis.  Table 3.4h shows that international banks  are significant cross-
border creditors of the Euro Periphery, the new member states and the group of candidates and 
potential  candidates,  but  that  these  bank  liabilities  are  much  smaller  for  the  other  emerging 
regions.  Table 3.4i reinforces the point that the domestic banking system is the main local 16 
 
counter-party  for cross-border bank loans across  all regions,  with  the non-bank sector  not  a 
major originator of cross-border liabilities. 
Table 3.4g. Multilateral Loans, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  2010 
New Member States  Bulgaria  12.6  3.8  3.1  2.9 
 
Czech Republic  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
 
Estonia  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.1 
 
Hungary  0.8  0.1  9.3  9.2 
 
Latvia  3.0  0.3  5.6  8.2 
 
Lithuania  2.8  0.1  0.1  0.1 
 
Poland  1.2  0.4  1.0  1.3 
 
Romania  5.7  1.5  7.8  11.5 
 
Slovakia  0.8  0.4  0.3  0.2 
 
Slovenia  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  12.5  8.4  7.7  8.1 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  18.9  10.0  10.6  12.4 
 






       
 
Turkey  11.9  2.3  2.9  2.4 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  30.8  12.2  22.6  23.8 
 
Georgia  23.5  11.1  20.6  22.6 
 
Moldova  29.1  13.5  11.0  13.8 
   Ukraine  9.7  1.9  12.2  11.8 
Source: World Bank, Joint External Debt Hub. Note: This table reports multilateral loans, total. 
 
In terms of the issuance of international debt securities, Tables 3.4j and 3.4k show that 
Emerging Europe has a similar profile to Emerging Asia and Emerging Latin America, with 
cross-border bond debt much smaller than cross-border loans.   
Table 3.4h. Loans from Banks, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009  2010 
Euro Periphery   70  116  131  128 
Emerging Latin America  14  8  9  8 
Emerging Asia  13  13  11  11 
          New Member States  11  37  41  37 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  11  23  27  24 
Eastern Partnership Countries  3  8  8  7 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports cross-border loans from BIS banks. 
 
Table 3.4i. Loans from Banks to Nonbanks, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009  2010 
Euro Periphery   16  29  33  35 
Emerging Latin America  10  5  6  4 
Emerging Asia  5  4  4  4 
          New Member States  5  12  14  13 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  7  12  15  14 
Eastern Partnership Countries  2  2  3  3 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports cross-border loans from BIS banks to nonbanks. 
 
Finally, Tables 3.4l and 3.4m show some striking differences in the structure of cross-
border  banking  across  the  region.    In  the  Euro  Periphery,  the  consolidated  exposures  of 
international banks is much smaller than the locational exposures, reflecting the role of the Euro 
Periphery in re-intermediating wholesale bank flows (primarily in Ireland).  In Emerging Latin 
America  and  Emerging  Asia,  there  is  little  difference  between  consolidated  and  locational 17 
 
exposures.    However,  in  Emerging  Europe,  consolidated  exposures  are  substantially  above 
locational  exposures,  reflecting  the  important  role  of  foreign-owned  banks  in  the  domestic 
banking sector of this region.  
Table 3.4j. International Debt Securities, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009  2010 
Euro Periphery   41  156  220  227 
Emerging Latin America  25  15  12  10 
Emerging Asia  12  9  10  9 
          New Member States  10  9  13  14 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  9  5  7  7 
Eastern Partnership Countries  2  4  6  6 
Source: World Bank, Joint External Debt Hub. Note: This table reports international debt securities, all maturities. 
 
Table 3.4k. International Debt Securities, Nonbanks, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009  2010 
Euro Periphery   31  112  167  172 
Emerging Latin America  24  14  11  9 
Emerging Asia  10  8  8  8 
          New Member States  9  7  11  13 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  12  6  6  6 
Eastern Partnership Countries  2  2  4  5 
Source: World Bank, Joint External Debt Hub. Note: This table reports international debt securities, nonbanks. 
 
Table 3.4l. Liabilities to Banks, Consolidated, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009  2010 
Euro Periphery   73  130  125  114 
Emerging Latin America  17  12  13  11 
Emerging Asia  14  15  15  16 
          New Member States  25  58  61  57 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  18  45  38  39 
Eastern Partnership Countries  4  9  11  11 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports liabilities to BIS banks, consolidated total. 
 
Table 3.4m. Liabilities to Banks, Locational, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009  2010 
Euro Periphery   100  182  199  184 
Emerging Latin America  17  11  11  10 
Emerging Asia  16  17  15  15 
          New Member States  17  49  52  49 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  11  26  27  25 
Eastern Partnership Countries  3  9  10  8 
Source: BIS. Note: This table reports liabilities to BIS banks, locational total. 
 
Finding 3.1:  External Debt Liabilities 
  The rapid growth in external liabilities has led some countries to seek official assistance 
(Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine). 
  However,  the  overall  external  liability  position  exaggerates  the  debt  problem  for  most 
countries in the sample, in view of the importance of equity financing. 
  The high level of foreign reserves in most countries also provides a buffer against external 
funding problems. 18 
 
3.2  Domestic Exposures 
In  the  previous  subsection,  we  focused  on  the  aggregate  external  balance  sheet  of 
countries.  However, the sectoral distribution of external liabilities also matters.  In addition, 
purely domestic liabilities between sectors also can have macroeconomic consequences. 
In this subsection, we first examine the evolution of government debt.  Next, we consider 
the aggregate indebtedness of the private sector.  Subsequently, we consider the balance sheets of 
banks, households and non-financial corporations. 
Sovereign debt is distinct from private-sector debt for several reasons.  First, it is well 
understood that there can only be limited enforcement of sovereign debt claims. Rather, the 
repayment of sovereign debt depends on the willingness and ability to pay of the government.  If 
the implications for its taxation and spending decisions are too onerous or if it is unable to raise 
new funding, a sovereign government may seek rescheduling or default on its debt.   
Second, a sovereign government can take a broad perspective on the macroeconomic 
implications of its debt liabilities.  In particular, a sovereign will internalize the implications of 
the level of sovereign debt for the prospective growth rate of the economy, since it cares both 
directly  about  the  living  standards  of  its  citizens  and  also  indirectly  about  the  revenue 
consequences of a low growth rate.  In contrast, private-sector entities may fail to take into 
account  the  externalities  associated  with  high  individual  debt  levels,  leading  to  an  over-
borrowing situation relative to the social optimum. 
Third, the bargaining position of a sovereign vis-à-vis its creditors is different relative to 
private-sector entities.  In addition to its legislative autonomy, the scale of sovereign debt dwarfs 
any that of any individual private-sector entity, such that its leverage vis-à-vis its creditors is the 
greater.    However,  in  the  other  direction,  the  sovereign  will  also  internalize  the  possible 
economic and social costs of the disruption that is typically associated with debt default events. 
Table 3.5 shows the public debt levels for each country.  For the new member states, 
public debt ratios fell between 2002 and 2007 to a relatively-low mean of 25 percent of GDP.  
During the crisis, the average level has climbed to 35 percent.  The main country of concern is 
Hungary, where the debt level in 2009 stood at 78 percent.  In contrast, the Baltic States had 
much lower public debt levels, even if the Latvian debt ratio has grown quickly between 2007 
and 2009. 
In relation to the other countries, this group also saw a sizeable reduction in public debt 
levels between 2002 and 2007 from 53 percent to 30 percent.  For this group, the increase in 
public debt during the crisis was quite mild, rising only to 37 percent of GDP. 
Table 3.5a shows that the levels of public debt in emerging Europe are far behind the 
Western European periphery and are also below the levels in emerging Asia and emerging Latin 
America.  Of  course,  the  measured  level  of  public  debt  does  not  fully  capture  sovereign 
exposures.  A sovereign may be also be liable for the debts incurred through off balance sheet 
maneuvers  and  public  enterprises,  while  the  central  government  may  also  be  the  effective 
guarantor for the debts of sub-national levels of government. In addition, the level of public debt 
can quickly rise if a government opts to take over the debts incurred by private-sector entities or 
inject  capital  into  over-leveraged  enterprises.    The  financial  health  of  the  government  also 19 
 
depends on the extent of implicit liabilities, such as unfunded pension commitments for an aging 
population. 
Table 3.5. Government Debt, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria  52  17  15 
  Czech Republic  28  29  35 
  Estonia  6  4  7 
  Hungary  56  66  78 
  Latvia  14  9  37 
  Lithuania  22  17  30 
  Poland  42  45  51 
  Romania  25  13  24 
  Slovak Republic  43  30  35 
  Slovenia  28  23  35 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  65  54  60 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina  32  33  35 
  Croatia  40  33  35 
  Macedonia, FYR  49  32  21 
  Serbia       
  Turkey  93  39  45 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  37  16  41 
  Georgia  53  22  37 
  Moldova  73  27  28 
   Ukraine  34  12  35 
Source: Eurostat, Abbas et al (2010). 
Table 3.5a. Government Debt, Percent of GDP 
   2002  2007  2009 
Euro Periphery   61  55  78 
Emerging Latin America  75  46  44 
Emerging Asia  47  38  42 
        New Member States  32  25  35 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  56  38  39 
Eastern Partnership Countries  49  19  35 
Source: Eurostat, Abbas et al (2010). 
 
In  relation  to  private-sector  indebtedness,  a  useful  aggregate  indicator  is  the  ratio  of 
private credit to GDP.
5  Table 3.6 shows the evolution of this measure, using World Bank data.   
For the new member states, this ratio grew quickly between 2002 and 2007 and continued  to 
climb between 2007 and 2009.   The Baltic States, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovenia have the 
highest ratios but these remain well below the levels in more financially -developed advanced 
economies.  The private credit ratio is far lower for the other emerging European economies but 
the rate of expansion over 2002 to 2009 has been broadly at the same pace.  
In comparative terms, Table 3.6a shows that private credit in the new member states 
exceeds the level of financial development in emerging Asia and emerging Latin America but the 
other regions in emerging Europe are broadly similar to these other regions. 
   
                                                 
5 In addition to obtaining credit from the domestic banking system, domestic entities can also borrow directly from 
overseas banks or by issuing bonds domestically or internationally.  Table 3.4b shows the extent of cross-border 
borrowing by non-banks, while Table 3.4k shows the extent of international bond issuance by non-banks. However, 
in the other direction, some domestic credit might be redirected to other countries. For instance, the local affiliate of 
a multinational might borrow locally and make an inter-company loan to other units in the global enterprise. 20 
 
Table 3.6. Private Credit, Percent of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria  17  53  84 
  Czech Republic  34  43  56 
  Estonia  40  84  119 
  Hungary  32  57  73 
  Latvia  28  82  108 
  Lithuania  14  51  75 
  Poland  27  35  48 
  Romania  8  28  49 
  Slovak Republic  37  39  48 
  Slovenia  38  69  94 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  Albania  6  25  54 
  Bosnia and Herzegovina       
  Croatia  44  67  79 
  Macedonia, FYR  17  33  51 
  Serbia  21  28  35 
  Turkey  13  26  36 
Eastern Partnership Countries  Armenia  7  10  18 
  Georgia  7  22  44 
  Moldova  15  30  47 
   Ukraine          
Source: Beck et al (2009). Note: Table reports private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions. 
 
Table 3.6a. Private Credit, Percent of GDP 
  
  
2002  2007  2009 
Euro Periphery   99  149  181 
Emerging Latin America  30  33  44 
Emerging Asia  78  60  53 
        New Member States  28  54  75 
Candidates and Potential Candidates  20  36  51 
Eastern Partnership Countries  10  21  36 
Source: Beck et al (2009). 
The EBRD also reports a private credit measure.  In addition, it reports the subcomponent 
that relates to lending to households and, within household loans, the scale of mortgage loans.  
These  are  reported  in  Table  3.6b.    These  data  show  that  lending  to  households  outpaced 
aggregate lending between 2004 and 2007 but the ratio stabilized or even fell slightly between 
2007 and 2009 in most cases.  In addition, mortgage loans are only important in the Baltic States 
and, to a lesser degree, in Hungary.  In part, the declining share of the corporate sector in credit 
between 2004 and 2007 may reflect the role played by direct cross-border loans in the corporate 
sector, which relied less on the domestic banking sector for debt financing (Herzberg 2010). 
In Tables 3.7 to 3.9, we look at the sectoral distribution of liabilities for the new member 
states.  Table 3.7 shows that household debt levels grew very quickly between 2002 and 2007 in 
Hungary, the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania.  However, this expansion was from quite low 
levels  of  household  indebtedness  in  most  cases.    During  the  crisis,  household  debt  levels 
expanded  further,  especially  in  Bulgaria  and  Slovenia.    As  noted  by  Herzberg  (2010),  the 
household debt levels have to be assessed in the context of relatively-low stocks of household 
financial assets in emerging Europe, compared to advanced economies. 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the sectoral balance sheets for non-financial corporations and 
financial  corporations  respectively.    The  liabilities  of  the  non-financial  sector  grew  rapidly 
between 2002 and 2007 in the Baltic States, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania but were much 21 
 
more stable in Poland and Slovenia.  Similar patterns apply for financial corporations.  (In both 
cases, the data refer to aggregate liabilities, which in part will take the form of equity.) 
Table 3.6b.  Private Sector Credit, Households, Percent of GDP 
  
Country 
Private Credit, % of 
GDP 
Private Credit to 




% of GDP 
2004  2007  2009  2004  2007  2009  2004  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria   35.2  62.8  75.3  10  23  28.2  2.7  10.4  13.5 
 
Czech Republic  
                 
 
Estonia   39.6  86.1 
 
19.7  43.3  52.5  14.6  37.7  46.5 
 
Hungary   44.3  59.5  66.5  12.8  21.6  26.8  9.5  16.4  21.2 
 
Latvia   50.3  88.3  103.3  17.6  42.7  47.5  12.4  33.7  36.9 
 
Lithuania   28.8  60.4  69.8  7.1  24.4  29.2  5.5  17.2  22 
 
Poland   31  44.6  55.2  10.6  20  28.7  3.8  9.9  15.8 
 
Romania   15.6  35.6  40.7  4.8  17.7  19.1  0.5  1.4  4.5 
 
Slovakia   30.4  42.4  51.1  8.6  16.3  22.2  2.9  4.5  6 
 
Slovenia   48.1  78.8  92.7  12.2  19.2  22.6  2.8  6.2  9 
Candidates and 
Potential Candidates 
Albania   9.6  30  37.2  2.8  10.6  12.5  1.4 
 
8.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  32.3  44.4  50.2  13.6  26.2  26.3 
     
 
Croatia   51.8  67.1  69.6  30.4  41.1  36.9  10.1  16.4  15.9 
 
Macedonia, FYR  22.1  36.8  42.9  5.6  13.5 




Serbia   24.8  35.3  45  4.9  12.6 
 
0.7  3.8 
 
 
Turkey   17.3  29.5  33.6  4.9  11.6  14.4  0.5  3.9  4.8 
Eastern Partnership 
Countries 
Armenia   7  13.6  23.6  2.9  7.1  9.9 
 
1.7  2.7 
Georgia   9.7  27.1 
 
2.8  8.8  10  1  2.6  5.1 
 
Moldova   0  0  0  0.9  5.5  3.3  1.1  4  3.9 
   Ukraine   25.2  58.2  73.3  6.6  22.5  26.4 
 
6.5  14.5 
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 
 
Finally,  Table  3.10  shows  the  data  for  the  category  of  “other  monetary  financial 
institutions”.    This  group  saw  a  substantial  decline  in  net  financial  assets  (often  negative) 
between 2002 and 2007 but there was a marked deleveraging between 2007 and 2009. 
Table 3.7. Household Balance Sheets 
   
Household, Net 
Financial Assets, % of 
GDP 
Household Gross Financial 
Liabilities, % of GDP 
Household Gross Loan 
Liabilities, % of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria   50  84  57     7  26  50     4  23  29 
 
Czech Republic   53  54  55  18  25  28  35  7  10  25  31 
 
Estonia   52  62  67  10  18  58  69  7  14  48  58 
 
Hungary   62  64  64  5  11  50  54  4  11  30  38 
 
Latvia   34  5  10  2  4  33  42  3  9  48  51 
 
Lithuania   45  29  39  8  14  33  41  2  3  27  33 
 
Poland   41  51  43  8  16  25  33  6  13  24  32 
 
Romania   33  56  47  4  4  26  31  1  2  20  24 
 
Slovak Republic   39  13  12     21  29  33  5  9  24  34 
   Slovenia   67  79  79  9  16  34  48     16  25  29 
Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 3.8. Non-Financial Corporations Balance Sheets 




Financial Assets, % 
of GDP  
Non-Financial Corporations 
Gross Financial Liabilities, % 
of GDP 
Non-Financial Corporations 
Gross Loan Liabilities, % of 
GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria   -68  -192  -190 
 
171  431  385 
 
42  106  142 
 
Czech Republic   -89  -96  -86  200  193  219  212  56  42  39  40 
 
Estonia   -117  -168  -184  224  222  324  365  52  67  108  127 
 
Hungary   -99  -103  -126  119  145  173  191  46  58  92  127 
 
Latvia   -83  -82  -95  135  130  179  188  27  45  79  96 
 
Lithuania   -84  -97  -107  212  248  351  412  27  26  55  55 
 
Poland   -71  -78  -81  143  153  162  152  28  33  31  35 
 
Romania   -82  -123  -121  216  161  246  276  31  30  43  58 
 
Slovak Republic   -45  -54  -45 
 
205  254  247  39  23  25  30 
   Slovenia   -92  -123  -118  156  136  139  138     50  79  95 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Table 3.9. Financial Corporations Balance Sheets 
     
Financial 
Corporations, Net 
Financial Assets, % 
of GDP 
Financial Corporations Gross 
Financial Liabilities, % of 
GDP 
Financial Corporations Gross 
Loan Liabilities, % of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria   3  -36  14     85  205  175     9  19  17 
   Czech Republic   0  -3  0  170  163  168  173  5  12  9  8 
   Estonia   -17  0  7  109  147  203  221  31  33  29  24 
   Hungary   -2  -7  2  70  102  190  213  11  13  26  35 
   Latvia   -3  -2  8  43  55  127  136  6  9  56  79 
   Lithuania   -1  -1  2  136  116  178  214  5  8  13  11 
   Poland   16  -14  -3  82  84  138  141  5  5  8  13 
   Romania   0  -3  8  50  49  101  104  3  3  12  22 
   Slovak Republic   -19  2  8     136  197  221  15  13  36  35 
   Slovenia   8  4  3  118  148  149  152     17  47  52 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
Table 3.10. Other Financial Corporations Balance Sheets 




Financial Assets, % 
of GDP 
Other Monetary Financial 
Institutions Gross Financial 
Liabilities, % of GDP 
Other Monetary Financial 
Institutions Gross Loan 
Liabilities, % of GDP 
   Country  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009  1999  2002  2007  2009 
New Member States  Bulgaria   3  -31  -7     40  131  111     1  8  12 
   Czech Republic   4  -1     112  96  106     0  4  3    
   Estonia   -10  0  5  61  80  134  150  8  7  5  5 
   Hungary   -1  -6  1  69  70  117  136  7  8  6  21 
   Latvia   -2  -1  10  48  77  145  151  4  4  39  61 
   Lithuania   -1  -2  1  27  32  84  96  3  4  0  0 
   Poland   9  -11     56  56  79     3  3  6    
   Romania   -3  -1  7  32  31  63  63  2  1  7  10 
   Slovak Republic   -18  12  37  79  81  66  46  10  4  9  10 




Finding 3.2:  Domestic Exposures 
  Public debt is still comparatively low in most countries, although Hungary (and possibly 
Albania) are important exceptions. 
  The rapid growth in private credit poses the risk of non-performing loans in some countries. 
  The sectoral balance sheet data show that households, corporates and banks have increased 
the  size  of  their  balance  sheets  but  these  remain  relatively  small  compared  to  advanced 
economies. 
 
4.  Debt Overhang at the Firm, Household and Bank Level 
4.1  Debt Overhang in the Enterprise Sector 
In this section we examine the level and currency structure of bank credit among firms in 
Emerging Europe.  Relating firm debt to aggregate contraction in GDP, export volume as well as 
to  currency  depreciation  we  assess  in  which  countries  firms  are  more  likely  to  face  debt 
overhang due to excessive leverage and unhedged foreign currency borrowing.  
The Use of Bank Credit 
The  main  data  source  of  our  analysis  is  the  Business  Environment  and  Enterprise 
Performance  Survey  (BEEPS).    The  European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development 
(EBRD) and the World Bank jointly conducted this survey in 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2009.
6 Our 
analysis is based on the 200 9 wave of the survey,  which was carried out at the onset of the 
financial crisis (October 2008 – April 2009). BEEPS 2009 provides data on 9,098 firms from the 
21 ECA countries  covered in  this  background  paper.    The sample provides a representative 
sample of firms for each of these countries.
7  By contrast, databases that offer financial statement 
information, such as Worldscope or Amadeus, typically cover only the larger, formal enterprises 
in the region.  
We use three indicators of the use of bank credit by firms.  Our first indicator Bank loan 
is a dummy variable measuring whether the firm had a bank loan or credit line at the time of the 
survey (end of 2008, beginning of 2009).  Likewise the indicator Overdraft is a dummy variable 
measuring whether the firm had access to an overdraft facility at the time of the survey.  Finally, 
the indicator Leverage captures the share of assets purchased in 2007 that were financed with 
bank credit (only measured for those firms which actually purchased assets in 2007).  Table 4.1 
provides  an  overview  of  these  three  indicators  of  bank  finance  by  country,  whereby  we 
distinguish between EU 10 countries, (potential) EU candidate countries and EU neighborhood 
countries.  The table shows that half of the firms in Emerging Europe use bank loans or an 
overdraft  facility,  while  on  average  only  one-quarter  of  recent  firm  investment  is  financed 
through a bank loan.  The use of bank credit differs strongly across regions.  In the EU member 
                                                 
6 With BEEPS Brown et al. (2011a), and Popov and Udell (2010) analyse credit availability, Gorodnichenko and 
Schnitzer (2010) analyse financial constraints and firm innovation, while Ranciere et al. (2010) focus on the impact 
of currency mismatch on firm performance. 
7 The survey covers all  29 countries in which the EBRD is operational, with the exception of Turkmenistan. See 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm for detailed information on BEEPS 2009. 24 
 
countries 49% of the firms have a bank loan, while 26% of recent investment is through banks.  
Surprisingly, the use of external finance is higher in the candidate countries, where 60% of the 
firms have a bank loan. Firm leverage seems to be the lowest in the EU neighborhood countries 
where only 39 percent of the firms have a bank loan. 
Is the leverage of firms in Emerging Europe particularly low compared to firms in more 
advanced  European  economies?    Recent  evidence  suggests  that  the  use  of  bank  finance  is 
actually quite similar in emerging and advanced Europe.  Using data from the 2005 wave of 
BEEPS, Brown et al. (2011a) show that the share of firms which have a loan in Emerging 
Europe  is  only  slightly  lower  than  in  a  selection  of  Western  European  countries  (Ireland, 
Portugal, Spain, Greece, Germany). 
Table 4.1. Enterprise Credit by Country 
   Bank loan (%)  Overdraft (%)  Leverage 
(%)  EU members  49  42  26 
Bulgaria  39  28  28 
Czech Rep  48  58  17 
Estonia  50  41  23 
Hungary  42  47  33 
Latvia  48  19  28 
Lithuania  52  13  31 
Poland  50  52  23 
Romania  43  44  21 
Slovak Rep  43  53  21 
Slovenia  74  64  34 
EU (potential ) candidates  61  60  28 
Albania  49  84  15 
Bosnia  65  51  27 
Croatia  66  67  33 
Macedonia  62  21  29 
Serbia  67  66  29 
Turkey  56  68  38 
EU neighborhood  39  37  22 
Armenia  43  44  21 
Georgia  41  35  26 
Moldova  40  26  21 
Ukraine  32  44  18 
Total  50  46  25 
Source: BEEPS survey and authors‟ calculation. Note:  This table reports means for each indicator of credit use by 
country.  Observations  are  weighted  to  account  for  stratification  of  the  sample  with  respect  to  industry 
(manufacturing, retail and other services) as well as frim size. Bank loan is 1 if the firm currently has a loan or a 
credit line from a bank and 0 otherwise. Overdraft is 1 if the firm currently has an overdraft facility from a bank and 
0 otherwise.  Leverage is the share of firm investment in 2007 which was financed by bank credit. 
 
Which types of firms in Emerging Europe are indebted to banks?  Panel A of Table 4.2 
shows  that  the  incidence  of  bank  credit  is  related  to  firm  size,  financial  transparency  and 
economic activity.  In line with existing evidence on information asymmetries and credit access 
(see e.g. Brown et al. 2009), small firms (those which have less than 50 employees), young firms 
(less than 15 years old) and firms which are not financially transparent (i.e. do not have their 
accounts audited) are less likely to have bank credit.  Firms with export activities are also much 
more likely to have bank credit than firms which sell purely to their domestic market.  The 
effects  of  firm  size,  financial  transparency  and  export  orientation  are  also  economically 
important: Roughly 60% of large, audited and exporting firms have bank credit, while only 40% 
of small, non-audited or non-exporting firms do so.  By contrast, firm age, sector of activity 25 
 
(manufacturing  vs.  services)  and  ownership  (private,  state,  or  foreign)  seem  to  have  less 
influence on the use of bank credit. 
Table 4.2.  Firm Characteristics and Use of Bank Credit 
Panel A. Incidence of bank credit 
This panel reports means for Bank loan and Overdraft for the subsample of firms which have and don't have a specific 
firm  characteristic.  The  sample  tests  report  the  results  of  linear  independent  tests  which  examine  whether  credit 
incidence differs for firms with and without each firm characteristic. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10-level. 
    Share of firms (%)  Bank loan  Overdraft 
Small firm  yes  74  0.40     0.44    
   no  26  0.60  ***  0.61  *** 
Young firm  yes  62  0.42     0.47 
     no  38  0.48  ***  0.52  *** 
Audited  yes  44  0.55     0.55 
     no  56  0.38  ***  0.43  *** 
Manufacturing  yes  34  0.49     0.45 
     no  66  0.42  ***  0.53  *** 
Exporter  yes  26  0.58     0.60 
     no  74  0.41  ***  0.44  *** 
State owned  yes  5  0.47     0.49 
     no  95  0.44     0.47    
Foreign owned  yes  1  0.40     0.64 
     no  99  0.44     0.47  * 
 
Panel B. Leverage 
This panel reports the distribution of the variable Investment loan for subsamples of firms which have and do not have 
a specific firm characteristic. Chi-square tests report whether the distribution is significantly different for firms with 
and without each firm characteristic. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
      Investment share financed by  loan 
      no investment  0%  1% - 33%  34% - 67%  67%-100%  Chi2 test 
All firms     40  34  7  8  11    
Small firm  yes  48  32  5  6  10    
   no  28  38  9  11  14  *** 
Young firm  yes  42  34  6  7  11 
     no  36  35  8  8  12  *** 
Audited  yes  32  36  8  10  14 
     no  46  34  6  5  9  *** 
Manufacturing  yes  40  34  7  7  11 
     no  40  35  7  8  11    
Exporter  yes  30  36  8  11  15 
     no  45  34  6  6  10  *** 
State owned  yes  27  49  6  8  10 
     no  41  33  7  8  11  *** 
Foreign owned  yes  42  35  8  8  8 
     no  40  34  7  8  11    
Source: BEEPS survey and authors‟ calculation. Note:  The firm characteristics are defined as follows: Small firm is 
1 if the firm has less than 50 employees, and 0 otherwise. Young firm is 1 f the firm is less than 15 years old and 0 
otherwise. Audited is 1 if the firm has its accounts audited, and 0 otherwise. Manufacturing is 1 if the firm operates 
mainly in the Manufacturing sector, and 0 otherwise. Exporter is 1 if the firm yields revenue from cross-border 
sales, an 0 otherwise. State owned is 1 if the government has majority ownership of the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Foreign owned is 1 if a foreign company has majority ownership of the firm, and 0 otherwise. All means are 
adjusted for sample weighting in the BEEPS 2009 survey. 
 
Panel B of Table 4.2 provides an overview of the leverage of firms with regard to their 
recent investment.  The table displays the share of firms which are not leveraged at all, as they 26 
 
either did not invest or financed their recent investment without bank credit.  It further displays 
the share of firms with a low (1-33%), moderate (34-67%), and high (67-100%) level of bank 
financing  for  their  most  recent  investment.    The  table  shows  that  74%  of  all  firms  are  not 
leveraged,  either  because  they  did  not  invest  (40%)  or  invested  without  using  bank  finance 
(34%).  Those firms which did use bank finance to invest are equally divided between low debt 
levels (7%) moderate debt levels (8%) and high debt levels (11%).  In line with our findings on 
the incidence of bank credit we find that leverage is substantially higher among large, audited 
and export orientated firms.  Roughly 25% of large, audited and exporting firms have moderate 
to high leverage levels, while only 15% of small, non-audited or non-exporting firms do so.  
Again, firm age, sector of activity and ownership seem to have little effect on leverage.  
The data presented above suggest that “excessive leverage” in the region may be more 
widespread than recent research using financial statement data for large firms suggests.  Coricelli 
et al. (2009) examine balance sheet and income statement data for roughly 8,000 manufacturing 
firms from 12 countries in Emerging Europe over the period 2001-2005.  Their study aims to 
establish the threshold of firm leverage above which external finance reduces firm productivity.  
Their results suggest that on average the optimal debt level for firms in the region is around 40%.  
They find that the share of firms with leverage exceeding this level ranges from less than 5% in 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Hungary to more than 15% in Bulgaria, Latvia and Russia.  The BEEPS 
data presented above suggest that among a representative sample of firms in the region nearly 
20% display excessive leverage levels (according to the Corrichelli et al. 2009 threshold).  
What does this imply for the threat of debt overhang in the region?  The theory of debt 
overhang  suggests  that  high  levels  of  existing  debt  will  affect  the  future  operations  and 
investment of those firms that have been hit by a negative shock (Myers 1977).  For these firms, 
the returns from positive NPV projects in the future may be partly go towards paying off existing 
obligations, and therefore may not be undertaken.  Whether or not Emerging Europe faces a debt 
overhang among firms, depends therefore on whether those firms which are highly leveraged are 
those which were also strongly hit by the recent crisis.  In Figure 4.1 we examine whether this is 
the case.  Figure 4.1.a plots the share of firms with moderate or high leverage in 2008/2009 
(exceeding 33% of recent investment) per country against GDP growth per country in 2009.   
This figure suggests that four countries in the region may indeed suffer from debt overhang.  The 
Baltic states Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia all have more than 25% of highly leveraged firms and 
with a GDP contraction of 14%-18% in 2009 were among the most severely hit economies in the 
crises.  In addition, Slovenia and Croatia have shares of highly leveraged firms exceeding 30% 
and at the same time experienced contractions of more than 5% of GDP in 2009.  At the other 
end of the scale, countries such as Poland and Albania have few highly leveraged firms and 
experienced mild GDP contractions during the crisis. 
Given the dramatic decline in export income to the region in 2009 and 2010 and the high 
leverage levels among exporting firms (see Table 4.2), the tradable sector may be most prone to 
debt overhang.  Figure 4.1.b examines for which countries debt overhang in the tradable sector 
may be a particular issue.  The figure plots the share of moderately and highly leveraged firms 
within  the  tradable  sector  against  the  aggregate  decline  in  export  volume  in  2009.    Latvia, 
Lithuania Estonia, as well as Macedonia and Slovenia are most likely to be affected by debt 
overhang in the tradable sector: In each of these countries. more than a third of the exporting 
firms are  highly leveraged, and these countries experienced substantial contractions in export 27 
 
volume (more than 20%) in 2009.  Debt overhang in the tradable sector seems, however, to be an 
issue for a broader set of countries as well:  In Bosnia, Turkey, the Slovak Republic, Serbia, the 
Czech  Republic  and  Croatia  more  than  a  quarter  of  the  export-orientated  firms  are  highly 
leveraged and all of these countries  also  experienced huge negative shocks  to  their tradable 
sector. 
Foreign Currency Lending 
Foreign  currency  (FX)  borrowing  is  seen  as  a  major  threat  to  financial  stability  in 
Emerging Europe. More than 70 percent of all private sector loans in Estonia, Latvia, and Serbia 
are currently denominated in (or linked to) a foreign currency.   The share of FX loans also 
exceeds that of domestic currency loans in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (EBRD, 2010).  
With regard to debt overhang, foreign currency borrowing is a key potential driver among firms 
in the region.  The substantial depreciation of several currencies before and during the financial 
crisis imply that those firms which have taken unhedged FX loans now face a substantially 
higher  debt  burden,  which  may  constrain  their  operations  and  investment  going  forward.  
Whether or not FX lending may seriously curb the economic activity of firms in the region 
depends  on  the  answers  to  two  questions:  (1)  What  share  of  the  firms  in  the  region  hold 
unhedged foreign currency loans? and (2) Are firms with unhedged FX loans predominantly 
located in those countries where sharp depreciations have taken place? 
Several studies using aggregate cross-country data have suggested that FX borrowing is 
predominantly driven by retail customers taking unhedged currency bets.   Luca and Petrova 
(2008)  show  that  the  share  of  FX  loans  is  higher  in  countries  with  higher  interest  rate 
differentials.    This  finding  has  been  supported  by  Basso  et  al.  (2010)  or  for  example  by 
Rosenberg and Tirpak (2010).  Recent firm-level evidence suggests that FX borrowing in the 
region is not driven predominantly by unhedged customers taking currency bets to benefit from 
interest rate differentials. Examining the 2005 wave of BEEPS, Brown et al. (2011b) show that 
only 25% of the loans taken by firms in the ECA region are actually denominated in foreign 
currency.
8  Importantly, their evidence suggests that  those firms which take FX loans are more 
likely to be hedged against exchange rate risks: FX borrowers are more likely to have export 
activities, sales to multinational firms or foreign owners than firms which borrow in local 
currency.  This cross-country evidence is backed up loan-level evidence for Bulgaria (Brown et 
al. 2010) which shows that less risky clients are more likely to apply for and receive an FX loan.  
At the macroeconomic level both studies suggest that FX borrowing by firms in the region is 
hardly driven by currency bets: Changes in interest rate differentials over time seem to have little 
effect on the share of FX loans taken by firms within a country. Indeed, Brown et al. (2011b) 
find that changes in interest rates over time affects the frequency of FX borrowing in only two  
countries; Hungary and Serbia. 
While FX lending by firms in the region may not be primarily driven by carry -trade 
behavior, Brown et al. (2011b) point to a non -negligible share of unhedged FX loans in the 
region.  Their analysis suggests that 43% of all F X borrowers in the ECA region do not have 
                                                 
8 Evidence from Brown et al. (2010) suggests that the share of FX loans to firms did not further increase in the run 
up to the crisis. For example, while there was a significant increase in credit volume in Bulgaria between 2005 and 
2007, their data shows that the share of FX loans to firms  actually decreased from 37.6% to 33.6%.  28 
 
foreign currency income, and thus that roughly 11% of all loans in the region are unhedged FX 
loans.
9   
Figure 4.1 Firm Debt and Crisis Impact by Country 
Figure a. Excess leverage and GDP contraction by 
country 
Figure b. Excess leverage and contraction in the 
tradable sector 
   
Figure c. Unhedged FX loans and Depreciation 
 
Source: BEEPS survey and authors‟ calculation. Note: Figure a plots the share of highly leveraged firms (leverage 
exceeding 33%) per country against the GDP growth in 2009. Figure b plots the share of highly leveraged exporting 
firms (leverage exceeding 33%) per country against the Export volume growth in 2009. Figure c plots the share of 
unhedged FX loans as a percentage of total loans against the 2007-2009 depreciation of the local currency vis a vis 
the  euro.  GDP  growth,  export  volume  growth  and  exchange  rates  are  taken  from  the  EBRD  transition  report. 
Undhedged FX loans are calculated from Brown Ongena and Yesin (2011) which uses 2005 BEEPS data. 
Figure 4.1.c plots the share of unhedged loans by country from Brown et al. (2011b) 
against the cumulative depreciation per country against the euro in 2008 and 2009.  The figure 
shows that those countries with  the highest  shares  of unhedged FX lending experienced the 
smallest depreciations vis a vis the euro during the financial crisis.  Albania, with a depreciation 
of more than 15% and more than 30% of unhedged FX loans, seems most likely to be affected by 
                                                 
9 As noted above, according to he BEEPS 2005 data 25% of all loans to firms in the ECA region are FX loans. 
Among these FX loans 43% are to firms which have neither export income, sales to multinational companies or  
foreign ownership.  29 
 
debt overhang induced by unhedged FX borrowing.  By contrast, Ukraine which experienced the 
sharpest depreciation in the crisis (minus 55%) is unlikely to be affected, due to low levels of 
unhedged FX loans (8%).  All in all, figure 4.1.c suggests that increases in the debt burden of FX 
borrowers due to  exchange rate depreciations can hardly be viewed as a key driver of debt 
overhang in the region.  
 
Finding 4.1: Debt Overhang in the Enterprise Sector 
  Based on a comparison of the share of highly leveraged firms and GDP contraction during 
the crisis, debt overhang is likely to pose a general threat to firm activity in only a limited 
number of the more advanced countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovenia. 
  Leverage  levels  among  export-orientated  firms  and  the  widespread  contraction  of  export 
income in the region suggest that debt overhang in the tradable sector may be an issue for a 
broader set of countries: Latvia, Lithuania Estonia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Turkey, the 
Slovak Republic, Serbia, the Czech Republic and Croatia. 
  Despite sharp depreciations in many countries during the crisis, unhedged foreign currency 
borrowing by firms does not seem to be a source of debt overhang. The countries with a high 
incidence of unhedged FX loans experienced only minor depreciations during the crisis. 
 
4.2  Debt Overhang in the Household Sector 
In this section we assess potential for debt overhang in the household sector, i.e. the 
extent to which built up consumer and mortgage debt may curb future household consumption 
and  investment.    We  use  recent  survey  data  to  examine  the  incidence  and  distribution  of 
household debt across the region as well as how household debt is correlated to the impact of the 
crisis at the household level.  
Household Debt towards Banks 
Our analysis is based on the 2010 wave of the EBRD-World Bank Life in Transition 
Survey (LITS).
10  Within this survey at least  1,000 interviews were conducted with randomly 
selected households in each country.  In the 21 countries covered by this report a total of more 
than 23,525 households were interviewed.    The LITS questionnaire  gathers  information on 
household composition, housing, and expenses, as well as the current and past economic activity 
of the respondent.  Importantly for our purpose, the 2010 wave of the survey elicits inform ation 
on the incidence and type of bank debt in the household.  Households which own their dwelling 
are asked whether they have a mortgage.   If they do have a mortgage they are a sked about the 
type of mortgage they have, in particular whether it is denominated in local or foreign currency.   
Further households are asked whether any member of the household has a debit or credit card.   
The LITS dataset includes sampling weights to account for the differences in the ratio of sample 
size to population size across countries, as well as for sampling biases within countries.  The data 
                                                 
10 We thank the EBRD for advanced access to the LITS 2010 survey data. 30 
 
thus allow us to provide a representative analysis of the incidence and distribution of household 
debt by country.
11 
Table 4.3 displays the use of credit card and mortgage debt for households as well as the 
currency structure of mortgage debt by country.  The table suggests that only a minor share (6%) 
of all households in the region which own their dwelling ha ve mortgage debt.  Moreover, only 
one-third of these mortgages are denominated in foreign currency, implying that only 2% of the 
owner-occupier households in the region have a foreign currency mortgage.  Consumer credit via 
credit cards is used by a much l arger share of the population (26%).   Household use of bank 
credit differs strongly across the region: In the EU member countries 9% of households have a 
mortgage while this is the case for only 4% of households in candidate countries and 2% of 
households  in EU neighborhood countries.    Credit card use is also much less prominent in 
neighborhood countries (10%) than in either EU members (30%) or candidate countries (30%).   
Even within the EU member countries there are large differences in household use of cr edit.  In 
Hungary 16% of all owner-occupier households have a mortgage, and 55 % of all households 
have a credit card.  By contrast in Lithuania only 6% of households have a mortgage and 12% a 
credit card.  
Table 4.3.  Household Use of Credit by Country 
  Credit Card 
(%) 
Mortgage (%)  FX mortgage (%) 
EU members  31  9  4 
Bulgaria  15  4  1 
Czech Rep  41  11  0 
Estonia  31  17  9 
Hungary  55  16  9 
Latvia  34  9  7 
Lithuania  12  6  2 
Poland  19  4  2 
Romania  13  5  3 
Slovak Rep  41  13  0 
Slovenia  47  4  4 
EU (potential ) candidates  30  4  2 
Albania  18  2  1 
Bosnia  15  4  1 
Croatia  37  7  6 
Macedonia  33  2  0 
Serbia  21  4  3 
Turkey  58  3  0 
EU neighborhood  10  2  1 
Armenia  9  4  1 
Georgia  7  2  1 
Moldova  2  1  0 
Ukraine  21  1  1 
Mean  26  6  2 
Source:  LITS  survey  and  authors‟  calculation.  Note:    This  table  reports  means  for  each  variable  by  country. 
Observations are weighted to account for the varying size of the sampling units within countries. Credit Card is 1 if 
any member of the household has a credit card and 0 otherwise.  Mortgage is 1 if the household owns its dwelling 
and currently has a mortgage and 0 if it owns its dwelling but has no mortgage. FX Mortgage is 1 if the household 
owns its dwelling and currently has a foreign currency mortgage and 0 if it owns its dwelling but has no FX 
mortgage. 
 
                                                 
11 See Beck and Brown (2010) for a detailed discussion of the LITS survey. Information on the 2006 survey is 
available from: http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data/lits.shtml  
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Household leverage is substantially lower in Emerging Europe than in more advanced 
European  countries.    The  2010  LITS  survey  provides  comparable  data  for  five  advanced 
European economies: France, Germany, the UK, Sweden, and Italy.  In these countries 40% the 
households which own their home have a mortgage compared to just 6% in Emerging Europe.  
Also, 53% of households in advanced Europe have a credit card compared to 26% in Emerging 
Europe.  
The limited use of bank credit in Emerging Europe suggests that debt overhang in the 
household sector should not be a major impediment to overall future economic growth in the 
region.  To assess whether household debt may limit economic activity in selected countries, we 
need to examine which type of households use bank debt and how debt affects their consumption 
and investment.  Further, we need to look in more detail at whether household debt is more 
prevalent in countries that were the most severely hit by the crisis. 
The Distribution of Debt across Households 
Consumer  credit  and  mortgages  in  the  region  seem  to  be  concentrated  among  those 
households which are least vulnerable to economic shocks.  Table 4.4 examines the distribution 
of  credit  cards,  mortgages  and  FX  mortgages  across  household  types.    We  focus  on  three 
household characteristics which should capture their resilience to economic shocks: the income 
level of the household, whether the household depends on wage income or is self employed, and 
the education level of the household.  The table suggests that households with a mortgage or a 
credit card are substantially more wealthy.  For example households with a mortgage have an 
average income of more than 5,700 USD per year, while households without a mortgage have an 
average income level of just around 4,000 USD.  Households with a credit card or mortgage are 
also much more likely to have a household member with higher education.  We find that self-
employed households are not more likely to be indebted than households with wage income, 
which confirms that the more risky (self-employed) households are not more exposed to bank 
debt.  
Table 4.4.  Household Characteristics and Use of Credit 
   All households (n=23'525)  Households with mortgage (n=1'114) 
   
Credit card  Mortgage  FX mortgage 
   Full sample  yes  no 
Sample 
test  yes  no 
Sample 
test  yes  no  Sample test 
Income (USD)  4,107  5,702  3,559  ***  5,744  3,957  ***  6,219  5,381  ** 
Self employed 
(1=yes)  0.13  0.13  0.13     0.14  0.14     0.11  0.17  *** 
University degree 
(1=yes)  0.19  0.25  0.16  ***  0.30  0.18  ***  0.34  0.27  ** 
Source: LITS survey and authors‟ calculation. Note:  The table reports means for each household characteristic by 
credit status. The credit status variables are as defined in Table 3.3.1. The household characteristics are defined as 
follows: Urban is 1 if the household is located in an urban area and 0 if it is located in a rural area. Income is the 
OECD equivalized expenses in USD per year. Self employed is 1 if the household derives its income predominantly 
from self-employment or farming and 0 otherwise. University degree is one of the respondent has a university 
degree and 0 otherwise. All means are adjusted for sample weighting in the LITS 2010 survey. The sample tests 
reports the results of linear independent sample tests which examine whether household characteristics differ for 
households with and without a specific credit status. ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
 32 
 
Table 4.4 suggests that among the households with mortgage debt, households with a 
foreign currency mortgage are less vulnerable to economic shocks than those which have a local 
currency  mortgage.    Households  with  an  FX  mortgage  have  higher  income  and  are  better 
educate. It is particularly reassuring that self-employed households seem to be less likely to take 
on a FX mortgage than households with wage earnings. 
 
These findings partly confirm recent evidence by Fidurmuc et al. (2011) on intended 
borrowing in central Europe.  They examine household survey data from the EURO Survey, 
conducted  by  the  Austrian  Central  Bank  (OeNB).    This  survey  has  been  conducted  in  10 
countries  of  Eastern  Europe  on  a  half-yearly  basis  since  2007  and  elicits  information  on 
household  perceptions  of  economic  conditions  (e.g.  exchange  rates),  their  current  financial 
portfolios  and  their  intentions  to  borrow  in  the  near  future.    They  show  that  among  the 
households which intend to take a new loan, those which are younger, better educated, have with 
savings in euro, and have remittance income are more likely to take a foreign currency loan.  In 
contrast to the data presented above, however, they find that richer households are not more 
likely to demand FX loans. 
Household Debt and Crisis Impact 
Does the fact that credit cards and mortgages are held by the least vulnerable households 
imply that debt has had a negligible effect on household consumption and investment in the 
crisis?  The recently conducted LITS 2010 survey allows us to assess the impact of household 
debt on household consumption and investment.  In this survey households were asked whether 
during the crisis they reduced their consumption of goods (food, luxury goods alcoholic drinks), 
cut the use of services (phone, utilities, health insurance) or sold off some of their assets.  In 
Table 4.5 we relate the consumption and investment behavior of households in the crisis to their 
use of bank debt (Credit card, Mortgage).  We hereby control for household income, education 
and employment type.  The LITS survey also allows us to control for a range of economic shocks 
which may have hit the household during the crisis: job loss, income reduction, closing of a 
family business, or a reduction in remittance flows to the household.  
The multivariate analysis presented in Table 4.5 suggests that those households with 
mortgage debt were more likely to reduce their consumption and investment during the crisis.  
Households with a mortgage were 3% more likely to reduce their consumption of goods and 8% 
more likely to cut their use of services and 2% more likely to sell assets.  By comparison a job 
loss by a household member increases the probability of reduced consumption, cut services, and 
asset sales by 8%, 13% and 2% respectively.  Thus at roughly half the impact of the effect of 
income shocks, the impact of mortgage debt on consumption and investment are sizeable from 
an economic point of view.  Interestingly, we find no impact of credit card use on household 
consumption or investment.  This suggests that many credit card holders may not use them to 
incur substantial debt. 
In line with our analysis for foreign currency firm debt, FX mortgages do not seem to be 
a source of debt  overhang in  the household  sector.  Figure 4.2.b plots  the incidence of FX 
mortgages per country against the depreciation of the local currency against the euro in 2008 and 
2009.  The figure shows clearly that those countries with the highest incidence of FX mortgages 33 
 
experienced the smallest depreciation in the crisis.  Again, we cannot pick out a single country 
which experienced a severe depreciation and has a significant share of FX mortgages. 
Table 4.5. Household Use of Credit and Crisis Impact 
Dependant variable  Cut consumption  Cut services  Sold assets 
Model  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Credit card  0.014  0.018  0.005 
   [0.0126]  [0.0146]  [0.00460] 
Mortgage  0.0305***  0.0828***  0.0170* 
   [0.0118]  [0.0186]  [0.00898] 
Job loss  0.0738***  0.129***  0.0173*** 
 
[0.0157]  [0.0139]  [0.00599] 
Closed business  0.017  -0.016  0.005 
 
[0.0197]  [0.0186]  [0.00412] 
Wage reduction  0.0857***  0.0786***  0.003 
 
[0.00928]  [0.00989]  [0.00331] 
Less remittance  0.0349**  0.0806***  0.0172*** 
 
[0.0173]  [0.0169]  [0.00654] 
Income  0.001  -0.0273***  -0.001 
 
[0.00998]  [0.0105]  [0.00244] 
Self employed  -0.006  0.020  0.006 
 
[0.0158]  [0.0137]  [0.00528] 
University degree  -0.0382***  -0.0559***  -0.002 
   [0.0130]  [0.0126]  [0.00409] 
Method  Probit  Probit  Probit 
Pseudo R2  0.08  0.08  0.05 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
# Households  13,838  13,838  13,838 
# countries  21  21  21 
Source: LITS survey and authors‟ calculation. Note:  The dependent variables in this table are Cut consumption, Cut 
services and Sold assets. Cut consumption is 1 if the household reduced its consumption of goods in 2009 or 2010 
and 0 otherwise.  Cut services is 1 if the household reduced its use of health, utilities or telecommunication services 
in 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. Sold assets is 1 if the household sold off an asset in 2009 or 2010 and 0 otherwise. 
The variable Job loss is 1 if any household member lost his job since 2008, and 0 otherwise. Closed business is 1 if a 
family business was closed since 2008, and 0 otherwise. Wage reduction is 1 if a family member's wage income was 
reduced since 2008, and 0 otherwise. Less remittance is 1 if remittances from abroad to the family were reduced 
since 2008, and 0 otherwise.  All other variables are as defined in tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. All models report marginal 
effects  of  profit  estimations  and  include  country  fixed  effects.  Observations  are  weighted  according  to  sample 
weighting in the LITS survey. Standard errors are reported in brackets and are adjusted for clustering at the country 
level.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10-level. 
 
Our  analysis  above  suggests  that  debt  overhang  in  Eastern  Europe  is  a  concentrated 
phenomenon: Few households have mortgage debt.  But those households that do have mortgage 
debt have reduced their consumption and investment substantially.  Which countries are most 
likely to suffer from such mortgage debt overhang?  Figure 4.2.a plots the change in GDP per 
country in 2009 against the share of households with mortgage debt.  The figure suggests that 
mortgage debt overhang is hardly an issue in the region.  Estonia is the only country which 
experienced a sharp contraction in GDP in 2009 and boasts a high incidence of mortgage credit 
(17%).  
As mentioned above the use of credit cards seems to have had little impact on household 
consumption and investment during the crisis.  Thus it is questionable whether the high levels of 
credit card use actually influence economic activity.  Figure 4.2.c plots the change in GDP per 
country in 2009 against the incidence of credit card use.  The figure suggests that Estonia, Latvia 
and Ukraine are most likely to be affected by consumer credit.  These countries experienced 34 
 
GDP contractions 2009 and all have a large share of households which use credit cards (more 
than 20%). 
Figure 4.2. Household Debt and Crisis Impact by Country 
Figure a. Incidence of mortgages and change in GDP 
by country 
 
Figure b. FX mortgages and Depreciation 
   
Figure c. Use of credit cards and change in GDP growth by country 
 
Source: LITS survey and authors‟ calculation. Note: Figure a plots the share of households with a mortgage per 
country against GDP growth in 2009. Figure b plots the share of Households with an FX mortgage against the 2007-
2009 depreciation of the local currency vis a vis the euro. Figure c plots the share of households with a credit card 




Finding 4.2: Debt Overhang in the Household Sector 
  Mortgage debt seems to have had a significant adverse impact on household consumption 
and investment during the crisis. However, due to the low incidence of mortgage debt in the 
region hardly any country, except Estonia, seems to face a threat of debt overhang. 35 
 
  The use of credit cards is much more widespread in the region than mortgage debt. However, 
credit card use has had a negligible effect on household income and investment during the 
crisis. It is unlikely therefore that credit card debt may jeopardize future economic activity in 
the region. 
  FX mortgages hardly pose a threat to future household consumption and investment. Only a 
minor  fraction  of  households  in  the  region  are  exposed  to  foreign  currency  mortgages. 
Moreover those countries  in  which FX mortgages  are most prevalent did  not  experience 
major exchange rate shocks during the crisis. 
 
4.3  Debt Overhang in the Banking Sector 
In this section we turn to the supply side of credit and examine which countries‟ banks 
are  more  likely  to  face  debt  overhang  problems  and  which  customer  group  might  be  more 
affected from these.  First, we relate the quality of banks‟ loan portfolios to their profitability and 
their lending activities.  Second, we review the literature on foreign banks‟ lending behavior 
during the crisis to assess whether they have contributed to the transmission of a shock that 
evolved unrelated to the local economic environment. 
Non-Performing Loans 
Throughout  the  transition  region  non-performing  loan  (NPL)  ratios  increased 
substantially in 2009.  Figure 4.3 illustrates the increase in NPL ratios between 2007 and 2009 by 
country and relates to bank performance and bank lending structure.  NPL ratios in Ukraine 
increased by nearly 50 percentage points in just two years, while banks in Georgia, Lithuania, 
Latvia and Moldova also experienced NPL increases of more than 10 percentage points. 
The very high level of the NPL ratio in Ukraine compared to the Baltic countries, which 
also experienced substantial economic contraction during the crisis, has been attributed to the 
large exchange rate depreciation in Ukraine and a subsequent rise in defaults on FX loans (see 
De Haas and Knobloch (2010)).  The household-level and firm-level survey data presented in 
sections 4.1 and 4.2 cast doubt on this exchange rate explanation: Only 51% of household loans 
in Ukraine are denominated in FX, while a mere 8% of the loans extended to firms in Ukraine 
are unhedged FX loans.  At the aggregate level corporate (household) loans account for 60% 
(40%) of all bank loans in Ukraine, suggesting that in total roughly one-quarter of all bank loans 
in the country are denominated in FX
12.  Moreover, the LITS data suggest that in Ukraine only 
16% of household mortgages denominated in FX were in default in 2010.  Income shocks as well 
as a drop in house prices are thus more likely to have spurred the strong increase in non -
performing loans. 
How well banks are able to cope with the credit losses they accumulated during the crisis 
should depend on their profitability.   Figure 4.3.a relates the increase in NPL ratios between 
2007 and 2009 to pre-crisis profitability of banks, measured by the 2005-2007 average return on 
assets (ROA) of banks in that country.  The figure shows that, besides Moldova, those countries 
facing the highest increase NPL ratios did not have particularly profitable banks in the pre-crisis 
                                                 
12 See EBRD Transition Report 2010. 36 
 
period.  The average ROA of banks in Ukraine, Lithuania and Latvia for example were between 
1% and 2%: Such levels of profitability are well within the norm for banks, given the high 
leverage in the sector.  However, they are small compared to the significant loan losses incurred 
in the crisis.  
Figure 4.3. Non Performing Loans (NPL) Country 
Figure a. NPL increases and prior bank profitability  Figure b. Severity of NPL problem and firm lending 
   
Figure c. Severity of NPL problem and household lending 
 
Note: Figure a plots the aggregate change in non performing loan (NPL) ratios by country between 2007 and 2009 
(in percentage points) against the 2005-2007 average return on assets (ROA) of banks in the same country. Figure b 
plots the ratio of NPL to ROA against the aggregate share of loans extended to firms (in %) in 2004 by country. 
Figure c plots the ratio of DNPL to ROA against the aggregate share of loans extended to households (in %) in 2004 
by country. The NPL ratios and the share of loans extended to firms resp. households are taken from the EBRD 
transition  report.  ROA  is  taken  from  the  updated  (2010)  version  of  the  Beck  et  al.  (2000)  financial  structure 
database. 
 
As an indicator of debt overhang in the banking sector we take the ratio of change in NPL 
to pre-crisis ROA.  This indicator exceeds 30 for the Ukraine, while it is between 10 and 20 for 37 
 
Lithuania, Hungary, and Georgia, and is just below 10 for Albania and Latvia.  Thus, assuming 
that all the assets of Ukrainian banks are loans these banks would require more than 30 years of 
pre-crisis profits to cover the loan losses incurred during the crisis.  By contrast banks in Estonia 
or Turkey could cover the increase in NPL during the crisis with 1 year of pre-crisis profits. 
The  analysis  above  suggests  that  banks  in  several  transition  countries  are  likely  to 
struggle with the high NPL ratios they have accumulated during the crisis and the possible losses 
associated with such loans.  One consequence might be a contraction in lending and the question 
that arises is whether firms or households would be more affected.  To assess this, we take data 
on the share of private credit extended to firms and households from the EBRD transition report.  
On average across our sample of countries the share of private credit extended to firms is 58% 
(mean 2007-2009), ranging from 44% in Croatia to 76% in Slovenia.  The share to households is 
thus on average 42% in our sample.  We plot the severity of the NPL problem (change in NPL 
ratio / pre-crisis ROA) by country against the share of loans made to firms (Figure 4.3.b) or 
households (Figure 4.3.c) respectively.  
Figures  4.3.b  and  4.3.c  show  that  the  countries  with  the  most  severe  NPL  problems 
(Ukraine, Lithuania, Hungary, and Georgia) all have structures of lending that correspond to the 
sample average. In all of these countries the share of lending to firms is roughly 60%, while that 
to households is roughly 40%.  This indicates that debt overhang in the banking sector of these 
countries is likely to affect both sectors, with firms slightly more affected than households.  
Foreign Banks during the Crisis 
Political as well as financial integration with Western Europe including a major presence 
of multinational banking groups had been the predominant model of development in most of the 
transition region since the mid-1990s.  This model of cross-border finance had stimulated long-
term  growth  (EBRD  (2009))  and  attenuated  the  effects  of  host  country  crises  as  foreign 
greenfield  banks  had  kept  their  lending  stable  whereas  domestic  banks  had  been  found  to 
decrease lending (De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2006)).   Thus, the availability of funds from 
internal capital markets made foreign banks in the transition region more resilient to host country 
crisis.  However, the very same linkages included the risk of the transmission of a crisis from 
these banks‟ home countries to emerging Europe.  Apart from that, foreign banks had been the 
drivers of an enormous credit boom including many foreign currency loans to often unhedged 
borrowers  (EBRD  (2010)).    So  how  did  foreign  banks  react  to  the  2007-2009  crisis?    Did 
multinational banking groups contract their lending in the transition region because of financial 
problems at their parent banks thereby reinforcing the real effects of the crisis? 
The empirical evidence so far is mixed.  Popov and Udell (2010) find that the financial 
distress at foreign parent banks was indeed transmitted cross-border to emerging Europe leading 
to a reduction in lending to firms during the early stage of the crisis in 2007-2008.  Their data on 
firms come from the 2009 wave of BEEPS (see section 4.1. for details).  They match this data 
with information on bank presence in the localities of firms and bank balance sheet data from 
Bankscope.  Although their dataset does not allow them to directly match firms with their banks, 
they  can  provide  evidence  that  firms  in  localities  served  by  foreign  banks  whose  parents 
experienced  financial  distress  have  a  higher  probability  to  be  credit  constrained.    Explicitly 
controlling for demand shifts and selection of firms out of the application process, they also find 38 
 
that high-risk firms  and firms  with  fewer tangible assets  were more affected by this  capital 
crunch.  
While these findings indicate that multinational banks transmitted the crisis from their 
home to their host countries, Navaretti et al. (2010) find that such banks rather had a stabilizing 
effect  on  bank  lending  during  the  crisis.    They  use  data  from  the  Bank  for  International 
Settlements (BIS) for their aggregate analyses and balance sheet information from Bankscope for 
their micro-level analyses.  On an aggregate level they find that, during the crisis, the share of 
local assets financed by cross-border funding increases in foreign affiliates.  On the micro level, 
they find that foreign affiliates reduced the ratio of customer loans to customer deposits less 
during the crisis than domestic banks.  They interpret their results as evidence for the well- 
functioning of the internal capital markets of multinational banking groups which supported local 
assets by cross-border funds.  
Berglöf et al. (2009) point out that it is surprising that there were no systemic currency 
and banking crises observed in emerging Europe despite the high vulnerability of many countries 
(increased private sector indebtedness, currency mismatches) and the severity with which the 
crisis hit the region after the Lehman failure.  In a country-level analysis using data from the BIS 
they find that foreign bank ownership mitigated bank lending outflows in the last quarter of 2008 
and the first quarter of 2009.
13  Furthermore, they hint at the impact of the political and economic 
integration with Western Europe without explicitly testing it. 
De Haas et al. (2011) use Bankscope data to assess the stability of bank lending in the 
transition region during the crisis ye ars 2008-2009.    Their results show that foreign bank 
subsidiaries decreased their lending earlier and faster than domestic banks whereas state -owned 
banks seemed to have been a relatively stable source of credit.   They also analyze the impact of 
home-country government support for the parent banks on their lending activities in emerging 
Europe because this support might have come with requirements to focus on lending in their 
home markets.  However, they do not find any impact of these support packages on l ending of 
foreign bank subsidiaries in emerging Europe.  
Finally, they study the impact of the so -called Vienna Initiative (VI), a coordination 
platform for multinational banks, International Financial Institutions, European Institutions as 
well  as  home  an d  host  country  regulatory  and  fiscal  authorities.    During  this  process, 
multinational banks signed commitments to keep their subsidiaries capitalized in five countries.   
While this decreased fears of foreign bank withdrawal from these countries, it was not clear 
whether banks would not instead withdraw funds from other countries to keep up their exposure 
in the VI countries.    They find that lending of foreign banks partici pating in the VI was 
somewhat more stable than lending of non-VI foreign banks.  Moreover, their results do not hint 
at  negative  spillover  effects  since  they  do  not  find  VI  banks  to  withdraw  from  non -VI 
countries.
14  
   
                                                 
13 Mihaljek (2009) finds similar results also using country-level data from the BIS. 
14 Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) show in a country-level study that in VI countries the contraction in domestic bank 
lending was attenuated.  
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Finding 4.3: Debt Overhang in the Banking Sector 
  The  strong  increase  the  in  non-performing  loans  (NPL)  compared  to  pre-crisis  bank 
profitability suggests that debt overhang in the banking sector is a threat in Ukraine, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary as well as in Georgia and Albania.  
  In the countries that face the most severe NPL problems, the share of private credit extended 
to firms (60%) and households (40%) is similar to the sample average.  This suggests that 
debt overhang in the banking sector of these countries is likely to affect both sectors, with 
firms slightly more affected than households.  
  The financial integration of Emerging Europe with the dominance of foreign banks seems to 
have  contributed  to  the  transmission  of  a  crisis  that  had  emerged  unrelated  to  the  local 
economic conditions. At the same time, this integration helped the region in managing the 
crisis by concerted actions of major players (Vienna Initiative, IMF and EU programs). 
 
5.  Policy Response 
5.1  Policy Response to the Credit Boom Prior to the Crisis 
Before the outbreak of the crisis regulators and policy makers had introduced various 
measures to deal with the credit boom in emerging Europe, in general, and with the increase in 
foreign  currency  lending,  in  particular.    Panel  A  of  Table  5.1  provides  an  overview  of  the 
measures taken to reduce credit growth in different countries throughout the transition region.  
The table reveals the variety of measures put into effect and shows that most countries used a 
mixture of several  measures  to  address  the problem of rapid  credit growth and the inherent 
macroeconomic and financial stability risks.  The aim of these measures was, in general, to both 
reduce the speed of credit growth and prevent a decline in credit quality (see Enoch and Oetker, 
2007).    The  most  widely  used  measures  were  monetary  measures  such  as  the  tightening  of 
reserve or liquidity requirements or increases in interest rates.  Also, prudential and supervisory 
measures were popular.  These included, for instance, closer monitoring of the risk management 
systems  and  asset  quality  of  bank  as  well  as  closer  and  more  frequent  inspections.  
Administrative measures such as direct credit controls or fiscal measures were less used.  In the 
case of administrative responses this could be explained by the distortions and costs which are 
associated with such policies.  In Croatia, for instance, borrowers switched to less monitored and 
supervised non-bank financial institutions after direct credit controls were introduced (Hilbers et 
al. 2005).  The absence of measures may simply be explained by the fact that the room for fiscal 
tightening was very small in most countries (Hilbers et al., 2005). 
As discussed in section 4, the pre-crisis lending boom was accompanied by a substantial 
increase in foreign currency lending.  Policy makers and regulators therefore took a range of 
measures to curb foreign currency lending.  Panel B of Table 5.1 summarizes the monetary and 
regulatory/supervisory measures which were taken before the crisis hit emerging Europe.  This 
panel shows that the most common means to reduce foreign currency lending taken before the 
crisis was aimed at the supply side by making foreign currency lending less attractive for banks.  
This  took  the  form  of  higher  risk  weights  for  foreign  currency  loans  in  capital  adequacy 
calculations  or  higher  provisioning  or  reserve  requirements  on  foreign  currency  lending.  40 
 
Interestingly, in early 2007, the Baltic states experienced a cross-border supervisory intervention 
which meant that Swedish banks reduced their financing to their subsidiaries because Swedish 
home supervisors were increasingly concerned.  This led to increased cross-border supervisory 
coordination and better information flow between home and host country supervisory authorities.   
Few countries addressed the demand side to reduce foreign currency borrowing by forcing banks 
to better inform borrowers about the risks involved in foreign currency loans or to tighten the 
eligibility criteria for such loans.  An example is the so-called “Recommendation S” in Poland 
which  required  higher  creditworthiness  of  borrowers  taking  out  a  foreign  vs.  local  currency 
residential  loan  and  advised  banks  to  clearly  disclose  foreign  currency  risks  to  borrowers 
requesting foreign currency loans (see Zettelmeyer, Nagy and Jeffrey, 2010).  
5.2  Policy Response since the Crisis 
When the crisis hit emerging Europe, most countries (an exception was Ukraine) relaxed 
or eliminated the enacted regulations in response to the slowing down or reversing of foreign 
capital inflows in the months after the Lehman failure (see EBRD, 2010).  However, since mid-
2009 when recovery was felt to start off and regulators turned to concentrating on the systemic 
risks arising from foreign currency lending many countries have introduce a further range of 
macroprudential and administrative measures.  Table 5.2 provides an overview hereof.  Again, 
the  most  widely  used  measures  aim  at  the  supply  side  concerning  higher  capital  or  reserve 
requirements on foreign currency loans or limits on open foreign currency positions of banks, but 
several  countries  also  introduced  stricter  eligibility  criteria  for  foreign  currency  borrowers.  
While  most  countries  relied  on  the  introduction  of  a  mixture  of  various  policy  measures, 
Hungary, Turkey and Poland made most extensively use of the available set of policy options.  
For instance, “Recommendation T” in Poland restricted the access to foreign currency loans for 
customers with lower income levels, improved the use of credit registries and required banks to 
provide even more information on risks of (foreign currency) loans to borrowers.  
There are three countries – Hungary, Moldova and Ukraine - that totally banned certain 
forms of foreign currency lending.  Ukraine banned foreign currency lending to households, 
while  Hungary  prohibited  the  registration  of  foreign  currency  mortgages.    In  Hungary,  the 
mortgage market ceased as an outcome of this step because long-term local currency lending was 
not equally available.  Attempts to foster local currency wholesale funding of banks had already 
been made before the crisis, e.g. with the creation of special purpose funds (see Abrams, 2008), 
but discussions about the development of domestic capital markets as a means to reduce foreign 
currency  lending  driven  by  foreign  currency  refinancing  of  banks  have  intensified  now, 
especially in the course of the Vienna Initiative. 
Apart  from  these  measures,  several  governments  introduced  laws  to  improve  the 
borrowers‟ situation vis-à-vis their banks and to shift the burden of the crisis to the banks.  In this 
respect,  Latvia  introduced  a  new  personal  bankruptcy  law  considerably  strengthening  the 
position of the debtor and most likely leading to higher losses at banks (Box 5.1).  Hungary 
introduced  a  guarantee  for  the  payback  of  home  credits  for  persons  who  have  repayment 
difficulties because of increased debt servicing requirements (Molnar, 2010) and is currently 
close to concluding a mortgage relief plan including; e.g., the possibility for borrowers to extend 
their mortgage by up to five years without additional costs (Box 5.2).  This comes on top of a 
bank solidarity tax for large banks which mostly affects foreign banks (see Kdrna, 2010).  
Table 5.1. Policy Response to the Pre-Crisis Credit Boom 
 
Panel A. Policy measures to curb credit growth 
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Source: Hilbers et al. (2005), Enoch and Oetker (2007). 
 Table 5.2.  Policy Response to FX Lending After the Crisis 
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Box 5.1: Latvia—Personal Bankruptcy Law 
In October 2009 the Latvian government proposed a mortgage loan plan that would limit the amount 
banks  would  be  able  to  recover  from  defaulting  mortgage  holders.  The  plan  included  capping  loan 
collections at the current value of the property rather than the value of the loan. Since property prices in 
Latvia  had  declined  by  around  70%,  such  a  practice  would  have  led  to  immense  losses  for  banks, 
especially northern European banks such as Swedbank or Nordea which dominate the Latvian banking 
market. As most of the Latvian mortgage loans are denominated in Euro, this proposal was interpreted as a 
step to make devaluation of the local currency less hurtful by removing the risk that the debt burden of 
foreign currency borrowers would increase (Financial Times, 6 October 2009).  
While the reproach that Latvia wanted to devalue its currency was immediately denied by its government, 
Swedbank reacted by threatening to withdraw business from the country if the plan was put into law 
although at the same time it expressed doubts that that would ever happen (Financial Times, 11 October 
2009). 
A new personal bankruptcy law to soothe the debt burdens of individuals and to allow them a fresh start 
was finally enacted in July 2010 after consultations between the government and the banks as well as the 
IMF and the EU had taken place. An earlier version of the law had been vetoed by the Latvian president 
because it had not distinguished between loans taken out to finance borrowers‟ own property and those to 
finance speculative investments in real estate. The law allows the scheduling of debt write-offs depending 
on a borrower‟s income and debt levels after the bankruptcy procedures. For instance, if a borrower can 
repay  at  least  50%  (35%)  of  the  debt  after  the  bankruptcy  procedure,  i.e.  the  sale  of  the  mortgaged 
property in most cases, the borrower‟s liabilities will be written-off after one year (two years) (Baltic 
Reports, 27 July 2010). While this means that banks have to bear higher losses, the Nordic banks do not 
expect severe impacts from the law because they have already set aside large provisions (Bloomberg, 27 
July 2010). However, the law will probably make loans harder to get in the future and might therefore 




5.3  Lessons from Past and Current Crises 
Claessens  et  al  (2011)  compare  financial  resolution  policies  during  the  current  crisis 
relative to previous crises.
15  These authors note that, while containment measures were quickly 
deployed, the current crisis, there has been much less by way of early restructuring of assets in 
comparison to previous crises.   Moreover, the level of conditionality of support for banks has 
been much lighter than in previous crises.   Taken together, this strategy has the potential to 
ultimately generate a high fiscal cost and intensified moral hazard risks in relation to future 
behavior.  
An important factor differentiating the current crisis from previous crisis is that the size of 
banking system is larger relative to GDP in most countries.   This has influenced policy choices 
along several dimensions.  In relation to liability guarantees, these have been narrower in scope, 
with countries typically avoiding blanket guarantees (with the exception of Ireland).  There has 
been a greater reluctance to crystallise loan losses, with stop -loss guarantees preferred to the 
creation of asset  management companies (again, with the primary exception of Ireland).  In 
addition, there have been fewer moves to isolate non -viable banks and impose operational 
restructuring, possibly for fear of contagion effects.   
These choices can be understood in terms of limiting the upfront fiscal cost of resolving 
the banking crisis but carry the risk that the exit from the crisis will be delayed.   For instance, 
Claessens et al (2011) are concerned that the restructuring of excessive household debts has not 
been very extensive, which may act as a drag on consumption growth.   However, there is less 
                                                 
15 See also Borio et al (2010). 
Box 5.2. Hungary—Bank Solidarity Tax and Mortgage Relief Plan 
In July 2010 the Hungarian government passed a special solidarity tax on banks to be able to meet the 
deficit targets as agreed on with the IMF and the EU when negotiating the stabilization package. The 
solidarity tax amounts to a 0.5% levy on banks‟ year-end assets for a time span of three years from the end 
of 2009 onwards (The New York Times, 22 July 2010). While other countries also have such bank taxes, 
the Hungarian rate is considerably higher. Moreover, the tax mainly hits foreign banks as they are the 
larger banks and the tax only applies to banks whose annual fiscal revenue exceeds a certain threshold 
(Kudrna, 2010). Foreign parent banks had warned that the tax might lead to a contraction in lending and 
economic activity and also the EU and the IMF had opposed the tax believing that it would not solve 
Hungary‟s  fiscal  problems  (Bloomberg,  25 June  2010  and  22 July  2010).  The  recent  decision of  the 
government  to  keep  up  the  tax  in  unchanged  form  also  in  2012  was  followed  by  a  statement  of  the 
chairman of the Hungarian Banking Association that this would lower banks‟ profitability and reduce 
lending (Reuters, 1 March 2011). 
In addition to this, the government announced a mortgage relief plan to help distressed borrowers in 
September 2010 when risks that borrowers might default on their foreign currency loans increased due to 
the  decline  of  the  local  currency  against  the  Swiss  franc.  The  proposal  includes,  for  example,  the 
possibility for borrowers to extend their mortgages by five years without any penalty and the ban for banks 
to levy additional fees for non-payment (Bloomberg, 16 September 2010). The plan met with banks‟ 
disapproval first, but in the following months the government and the banks worked together to come up 
with a mortgage relief plan that accommodates both sides. While the plan has not been enacted so far, it 
seems that the government plans to replace foreign currency loans of distressed borrowers with low-cost, 
state-subsidized loans (Budapest Business Journal, 6 April 2011). 45 
 
concern about the corporate sector, since the corporate sector was generally not over-leveraged 
coming  into  the  current  crisis.    (An  exception  is  real  estate  firms  in  those  countries  which 
experienced construction booms.) 
As noted above,  Ireland has  been  an exceptional  case during the current  crisis.   The 
extensive nature of its guarantee of the liabilities of the banking system in September 2008 is 
recognised as having been costly in terms of raising the fiscal cost of the banking crisis (Honohan 
2010).  The establishment of the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) was intended to 
cleanse  the  banking  system  of  the  development  property  loans  that  were  at  the  heart  of  the 
banking crisis.  This was a textbook move in many respects (Fung et al 2004, Honohan and 
Laeven 2006).  However, the scale of the crystallised losses for the banking system was so big 
that it required very large upfront recapitalisations by the government and was a key factor in the 
loss of market  confidence in  the sustainability  of the sovereign debt  in  Autumn  2010 (Lane 
2011). 
In  relation  to  the  restructuring  of  household  and  corporate  debts,  Laeven  and  Laryea 
(2009) and Laryea (2010) provide useful primers.  As noted by these authors, there are several 
levels of policy interventions that are possible.  
At one level, the role of public policy might be simply to ensure that the legal system 
facilitates  the  restructuring  of  private-sector  debts  through  the  optimal  design  of  bankruptcy 
procedures and efficient operation of the courts system.  Park (2001) reviews the East Asian 
experience with corporate restructuring and emphasises the value of procedural reforms such as 
the improvement of workout codes, the facilitation of debt/equity conversions and the recognition 
of out-of-court settlements.  
However,  even  if  a  reform  improves  the  steady-state  efficiency  of  the  private-sector 
financial system, a shift in regime in the aftermath of the accumulation of high debt shifts the 
bargaining power between creditor and debtor.  Accordingly, there may be resistance to mid-
crisis structural reforms, given that the original terms of these loans did not envisage a shift in the 
legal system within the lifetime of the existing loans. 
Moreover, if debt problems are very extensive and similar in nature across individual 
loans, a fully-decentralized approach will lead to congestion of normal bankruptcy mechanisms.  
Rather, it may be efficient to design a debt restructuring model that can serve as a template for 
restructuring individual loans. 
As outlined by Laeven and Laryea (2009), such a program should have the objective of 
converting troubled loans into performing loans, while mitigating moral hazard problems.  In 
terms of scope, a program should ensure that the restructured debts of the targeted group should 
be sustainable, while taking into account the fiscal position and ensuring that the allocation of 
burden sharing between creditors and debtors is aligned with the ability of each group to absorb 
losses.    Voluntary  participation  is  essential  if  legal  challenges  are  to  be  avoided,  while  the 
program  should  be  based  on  simple  rules  and  verifiable  information.    Finally,  ensuring 
transparent  and  accountable  operation  of  the  program  is  important  to  ensure  legitimacy  and 
protect taxpayers. 
In relation to government-sponsored programs, additional factors also are relevant.  In 
general, the government should provide incentives to debtors and creditors in order to take into 46 
 
account various externalities in debt workouts.  For instance, in relation to housing debt, the 
costliness  of  the  repossession  process  means  that  both  debtors  and  creditors  could  be  given 
incentives to minimize avoidable repossessions.  
In  relation  to  corporate  restructuring,  Claessens  et  al  (2001)  review  corporate 
restructuring policies from eight crises. In broad terms, these authors find that corporate recovery 
was indeed more rapid with fiscal interventions to support the banking sector (such as liquidity 
support, liability guarantees and the creation of an asset management company).  However, these 
authors caution that the taxpayer cost of these interventions was high and the net growth impact 
is unclear. 
A common theme in relation to the restructuring of corporate and household debt is that 
this is much more feasible if banks are sufficiently well capitalized to recognize losses.  In turn, 
this may require fiscal interventions to provide extra capital to the banking system. In this regard, 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al (2011) provide evidence from six Latin American countries over 1990-2005.  
These authors show that it is the health of the banking sector that is the key factor in determining 
whether  the  investment  behavior  of  firms  is  constrained  by  financial  shocks  such  as  large 
currency depreciations. 
Buffie (1989) describes the FICORCA scheme introduced in Mexico in the 1980s.  This 
scheme  was  targeted  at  firms  struggling  with  foreign-currency  debts  in  the  wake  of  peso 
devaluations.  The design of the scheme had it that firms did not receive any NPV subsidy, since 
lower  initial  peso  payments  would  be  offset  by  higher  late-stage  payments.    In  Buffie‟s 
judgement, this  scheme avoided a chain  of bankruptcies.  Laeven  and  Laryea (2009) provide 
further case studies of restructuring schemes. 
 
5.4  Assessment of Current Policy Measures in Emerging Europe 
Our analysis of debt overhang in Emerging Europe points to six main findings: 
External balance sheets:  The external imbalance problem has been more one of flows 
(high current account deficits in the pre-crisis years) rather than large stocks of external debt in 
most cases.  Equity funding means that net external debt is far lower than net external liabilities. 
Current account deficits have narrowed quite rapidly in most countries. 
Aggregate  domestic  balance  sheets:  Although  sectoral  balance  sheets  have  expanded 
rapidly, sectoral liabilities remain relatively low compared to advanced economies.  However, the 
rapid expansion in credit does suggest that non-performing loans could be problematic, due to 
deterioration in loan quality during intense credit booms. 
Governments: With the main exception of Hungary, public debt levels remain relatively 
low in Emerging Europe.  So long as the debts of other sectors are not socialized, the risk of 
sovereign debt crises in these countries is low compared to many advanced economies. 
Firms: Debt overhang poses a particular threat to activity in the tradable sector in the 
more advanced economies of the region.   By contrast, the impact of corporate borrowing in 
foreign currency is negligible. 47 
 
Households: Excessive leverage and exposure to FX borrowing are relevant only for a 
minor share of households  in  the region.   Debt  overhang does  not  seem  to  pose a threat  to 
aggregate investment and consumption in the household sector in any particular country. 
Banking sector: Substantial levels of non-performing loans suggest that debt overhang 
may constrain future lending in several countries (e.g. Latvia, Hungary). 
The above analysis suggests that the majority of policies taken by authorities in the region 
hardly address growth constraints arising from debt overhang: 
Authorities in most countries have focused on policy measures to curb FX lending and 
cushion the effects of exchange rate depreciations on existing FX borrowers, especially in the 
household sector.  Our analysis suggests that these will have little effect on aggregate investment 
and consumption in the private sector.  Indeed it is even questionable whether these measures are 
well targeted to deal with systemic risk in the banking sector.  Recent data from the Hungarian 
Central Bank, for example, show that the share of non-performing loans is twice as high for local 
currency loans (12%) than for foreign currency loans (just over 6%).  This suggests that the 
systemic risk to the banking sector in Hungary is currently arising from the real economy rather 
from foreign currency denominated lending.  
Authorities in selected countries (e.g. Latvia and Hungary) have taken measures to shift 
the burden of debt from households to banks.  These measures seem to be counterproductive 
in view of future economic growth: the marginal debt levels of households in the region suggests 
that over-indebtedness will hardly constrain economic activity in the household sector, while debt 
overhang in the banking sector seems to already pose a greater threat.  From the viewpoint of 
social  policy,  the  “relief”  measures  for  the  household  sector  also  seem  misguided  as  those 
households with mortgage debt are the more wealthy ones. 
Should authorities in the region then take measures instead to shift the debt burden away 
from the banks instead?  Should they follow the example of some industrialized countries in the 
recent crisis and East Asian countries at the end of the 1990s by using public funds to take 
“toxic” assets off banks’ balance sheets?  Our view is that such measures may not be necessary: 
those countries in the region that have experienced substantial losses in the banking sector are 
also characterized by a dominance of foreign-owned banks.  As illustrated in section 4.3, these 
banks have shown the ability and willingness to support their subsidiaries in Emerging Europe 
even in  times when they  were  facing substantial  challenges  in  their home markets.  It  seems 
plausible that these international banks will provide continued support to their subsidiaries in 
terms  of  the  necessary  capital  and  debt  funding.    Finally,  it  seems  both  politically  and 
economically  infeasible  that  authorities  in  Emerging  Europe  could  use  taxpayer  funds  to 
subsidize the activities of foreign-owned banks. 48 
 
References 
Abrams,  J.  2008.  Recent  developments  in  microfinance  foreign  exchange  risk  management. 
Geneva Papers on Inclusiveness No. 7. 
Aguiar,  Mark,  Manuel  Amador  and  Gita  Gopinath  2007.  “Sovereign  Debt  Cycles”,  NBER 
Working Paper 13353.  
Arellano,  Cristina  and  Naryana  Kocherlakota  2008.  “Internal  Debt  Crises  and  Sovereign 
Default,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
Arslanalp, Serkan and Peter Blair Henry 2004. “Is Debt Relief Efficient?,” NBER Working Paper 
No. 10217. 
Beck,  T.,  M.  Brown  2010.  Which  Households  Use  Banks?  Evidence  from  the  Transition 
Economies. European Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2010-25. 
Berglöf E., Y. Korniyenko, A. Plekhanov and J. Zettelmeyer 2009. Understanding the crisis in 
emerging Europe. EBRD Working Paper 109. 
Bolton, Patrick and Olivier Jeanne 2007. Structuring and restructuring sovereign debt: The role of 
a bankruptcy regime. IMF Working Paper, WP/07/192, 2007. 
Borio, Claudio, Bent Vale and Goetz von Peter 2010. Resolving the Financial Crisis: Are We 
Heeding the Lessons from the Nordics? BIS Working Paper No. 311. 
Brown, M., T. Jappelli, M. Pagano, 2009. “Information sharing and credit: Firm-level evidence 
from transition countries,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18, 151-172. 
Brown, M., Kirschenmann, K., Ongena, S., 2010. Foreign currency loans - Demand or supply 
driven? CEPR Discussion Paper 7952 
Brown, M., Ongena, S., Popov, A., Yeşin, P., 2011a. “Who needs credit and who gets credit in 
Eastern Europe?,” Economic Policy 26, 93-130. 
Brown, M., Ongena, S., Yesin, P., 2011b. “Foreign currency borrowing by small firms in the 
transition economies,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 20, 285-302. 
Budina, Nina, Gaobo Pang and Sweder van Wijnbergen 2007. “Nigeria‟s Growth Record: Dutch 
Disease or Debt Overhang?,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4256. 
Buffie,  Edward  1990.  “Debt  Management  and  Negotiations,”  in  (Jeffrey  D.  Sachs,  editor) 
Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 2: The Country Studies – 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, NBER. 
Cerra, Valerie, and Sweta Chaman Saxena 2008. “Growth Dynamics: The Myth of Economic 
Recovery,” American Economic Review 98(1), 439–457. 
Checherita, Christina and Philipp Rother 2010. The impact of high and growing government debt 
on economic growth: An empirical investigation for the euro area. ECB Working Paper 
Series 1237. 
Claessens,  Stijn,  Ishac  Diwan  and  Eduardo  Fernandez-Arias  1992.  Recent  Experience  with 
Commercial  Bank  Debt  Reduction.  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  No. 
0995. 49 
 
Claessens, Stijn, Daniela Klingelbiel, and Luc Laeven 2001. Financial restructuring in banking 
and corporate sector crises: What policies to pursue? NBER Working Paper 8386. 
Claessens,  Stijn,  Ceyla  Pazarbasioglu,  Luc  Laeven,  Marc  Dobler,  Fabian  Valencia,  Oana 
Nedelescu, and Katherine Seal 2011. Crisis management and resolution: Early lessons 
from the financial crises. IMF Staff Discussion Note 11/05. 
Cordella,  Tito,  Luca  Antonio  Ricci,  and  Marta  Ruiz-Arranz  2005.  Debt  overhang  or  debt 
irrelevance? revisiting the debt-growth link. IMF Working Paper 05/223. 
Coricelli, F. & N. Driffield, S. Pal, I. Roland, Isabelle 2009. Excess Leverage and Productivity 
Growth in Emerging Economies: Is There A Threshold Effect? CEPR Discussion Papers 
7617. 
Cottarelli,  Carlo,  Lorenzo  Forni,  Jan  Gottschalk  and  Paolo  Mauro  2010.  Default  in  Today‟s 
Advanced Economies: Unnecessary, Undesirable and Unlikely. IMF Staff Position Note 
SPN/10/12. 
De Haas, R. & I. van Lelyveld 2006. “Foreign banks and credit stability in Central and Eastern 
Europe. A panel data analysis,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 30, 1927-1952. 
De  Haas,  R.,  D.  Ferreira,  A.  Taci  2010.  “What  determines  the  composition  of  banks'  loan 
portfolios? Evidence from transition countries,” Journal of Banking & Finance, 34,388-
398. 
De Haas R., S. Knobloch 2010. In the wake of the crisis: dealing with distressed debt across the 
transition region. EBRD Working Paper 112. 
De Haas R. Y. Korniyenko, E. Loukoianova, A. Pivovarsky 2011. Foreign Banks During the 
Crisis: Sinners or Saints? European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.  
Diwan, Ishac and Dani Rodrik 1992. External Debt, Adjustment, and Burden Sharing: A Unified 
Framework. Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 73. 
Dooley, Michael P.  1986. An Analysis of the Debt Crisis. IMF Working Paper /86/14. 
Dooley,  Michael  P.  and  Lars  E.O.  Svensson  1994.  “Policy  Inconsistency  and  External  Debt 
Service,” Journal of International Money and Finance 13(3), 364-374. 
Dziobek, Claudia and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu 1997. Lessons from systemic bank restructuring: A 
survey of 24 countries. IMF Working Paper 97/161. 
Enoch C., I. Robe (eds) 2007. Rapid Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe, Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 2010. Transition Report 2010. Recovery 
and Reform, London. 
Fidrmuc J., M. Hake, H. Stix 2011. Households‟ Foreign Currency Borrowing in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Oesterreichische Nationalbank. 
Fischer, Stanley 1989. “Resolving the International Debt Crisis,” in (Jeffrey D. Sachs, editor) 
Developing  Country  Debt  and  Economic  Performance,  Volume  1:  The  International 
Financial System, NBER. 50 
 
Fung,  Ben,  Jason  George,  Stefan  Hohl  and  Guonan  Ma  2004.  Public  Asset  Management 
Companies in East Asia: A Comparative Study. Financial Stability Institute Occasional 
Paper No. 3, BIS. 
Furceri, Davide and Annabelle Mourougane 2009. The Effect of Financial Crises on Potential 
Output:  New  Empirical  Evidence.  OECD  Economics  Department  Working  Paper  No. 
699. 
Gorodnichenko,  Y.,  Schnitzer,  M.,  2010.  Financial  constraints  and  innovation:  Why  poor 
countries don't catch up? NBER Working Paper. 
Herzberg, V., 2010. Assessing the Risk of Private Sector Debt Overhang in the Baltic Countries, 
IMF Working Paper 10/250. 
Hilbers, P., Ötker-Robe, I., Pazarbasioglu, C. and Johnsen, G. 2005. Assessing and Managing 
Rapid Credit Growth, and the Role of Supervisory Authorities. IMF Working Paper. 
Honohan, Patrick 2010. The Irish Banking Crisis – Regulatory and Financial Stability Policy 
2003-2008. Commission of Investigation into the Banking Sector in Ireland. 
Honohan, Patrick and Daniela Klingelbiel 2001. Controlling the fiscal costs of banking crises. 
The World Bank, 2001. 
Honohan, Patrick and Luc Laeven 2006. Systemic Financial Crises: Containment and Resolution, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Imbs, J. and R. Ranciere 2008.  The Overhang Hangover. Paris School of Economics. 
International Monetary Fund 2009. What‟s the Damage? Medium-Term Output Dynamics after 
Financial Crises. World Economic Outlook (April), 121-151. 
Kalemli-Ozcan,  Sebnem,  Herman  Kamil  and  Carolina  Villegas-Sanchez  2011.  What  Hinders 
Investment  in  the  Aftermath  of  Financial  Crises:  Insolvent  Firms  or  Illiquid  Banks? 
NBER Working Paper No. 16528. 
Kirsanova, Tatiana Gordon Menzies and David Vines 2007. Stiglitz Versus the IMF on the Asian 
Debt  Crisis:  An  Intertemporal  Model  with  Real  Exchange  Rate  Overshooting.  CEPR 
Discussion Paper 6318. 
Kraay, Aart and Vikram Nehru 2003. When Is Debt Sustainable? The World Bank. 
Krugman, Paul 1988. “Financing versus Forgiving Debt Overhang,”  Journal of Development 
Economics 29, 253-268. 
Kudrna,  Z.  2010.  Financial  crisis:  Testing  the  relationship  between  banks  and  the  new  EU 
members. Emecon: Employment and Economy in Central and Eastern Europe 1, 1-19. 
Kumar, Manmohan S. and Jaejoon Woo 2010. Public Debt and Growth. IMF Working Paper 
10/174. 
Laeven, L. and T. Laryea 2009. Principles of Household Debt Restructuring.  IMF Staff Position 
Note 09/15. 
Lane, Philip R. 2011. The Irish Crisis. IIIS Discussion Paper No. 356. 51 
 
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti 2004. “The Transfer Problem Revisited: Real 
Exchange Rates and Net Foreign Assets,” Review of Economics and Statistics 86, 841-
857. 
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti 2007a. “The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: 
Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970–2004,” Journal of 
International Economics 73, 223-250. 
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti 2007b. “Capital Flows to Central and Eastern 
Europe,” Emerging Markets Review 8(2), 106-123. 
Lane,  Philip  R.  and  Jay  C.  Shambaugh  2010.  “Financial  Exchange  Rates  and  International 
Currency Exposures,” American Economic Review 100(1), 518--540. 
Larrain, Felipe and Andres Velasco 1990. Can Swaps Solve the Debt Crisis? Lessons from the 
Chilean Experience. Princeton Studies in International Finance No. 69. 
Laryea, Thomas 2010. Approaches to corporate debt restructuring in the wake of financial crises. 
IMF Staff Discussion Note 10/02. 
Luca, A., and I. Petrova 2008. „What drives Credit Dollarisation in Transition Economies?‟, 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 32, 858-869. 
Manzano,  Osmel  and  Roberto  Rigobon  2001.  Resource  Curse  or  Debt  Overhang?  NBER 
Working Paper 8390. 
Melzer,  Brian  2010.  Mortgage  Debt  Overhang:  Reduced  Investment  by  Homeowners  with 
Negative Equity, Kellogg School of Management. 
Molnár, M.  2010. Enhancing financial stability through better regulation  in  Hungary. OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 786, OECD Publishing. 
Mulligan,  Casey  B.  2008.  A  Depressing  Scenario:  Mortgage  Debt  Becomes  Unemployment 
Insurance. NBER Working Paper 14514. 
Myers, S., 1977. “The Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, 
5, 147-175. 
Navaretti G.B., G. Calzolari, & A. F. Pozzolo & M. Levi 2010. “Multinational banking in Europe 
-  financial  stability  and  regulatory  implications:  lessons  from  the  financial  crisis.” 
Economic Policy, 25, 703-753. 
Occhino, Filippo and Adrea Pescatori 2010. “Debt Overhang in a Business Cycle Model,” FRB 
Cleveland Working Paper 10-03R. 
Olney, Martha L. 1999. “Avoiding Default: The Role of Credit in the Consumption Collapse of 
1930,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1): 319-335. 
Panetta,  Fabio  Thomas  Faeh,  Giuseppe  Grande,  Corinne  Ho,  Michael  King,  Aviram  Levy, 
Federico  M.  Signoretti,  Marco  Taboga,  and  Andrea  Zaghini  2009.  An  assessment  of 
Financial sector rescue programmes. BIS Papers  48. 
Panizza, Ugo, Federico Sturzenegger, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer 2009. “The economics and law of 
sovereign debt and default,” Journal of Economic Literature 47(3), 651-698. 52 
 
Park, Yung Chul 2001. The East Asian Dilemma: Restructuring Out or Growing Out? Princeton 
Essays in International Finance No. 223. 
Philippon, T., and P. Schnabl 2009. Efficient Recapitalization. NBER Working Paper 14929. 
Popov,  A.,  Udell,  G.  F.,  2010.  Cross-border  banking  and  the  international  transmission  of 
financial distress during the crisis of 2007-2008. ECB Working Paper 1203. 
Powell, Andrew 2011. Debt Restructuring: Lessons from Latin America. VOX.LACEA. 
Ranciere, Romain, Aaron Tornell and Athanasios Vamvakidis, 2010. “Currency mismatch and 
systemic risk in Emerging Europe,” Economic Policy 25, 597-658. 
Reinhart, Carmen and Kenneth Rogoff 2010. “Growth in a Time of Debt,” American Economic 
Review 100 (2), 573–578. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 1989. “Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt Crisis,”  
in  (Jeffrey  D.  Sachs,  editor)  Developing  Country  Debt  and  the  World  Economy,  U 
Chicago Press. 
Shleifer, Andrei 2003. “Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?,” American Economic Review 
93(2), 85-90. 
Zettelmeyer, J., P. Nagy, and S. Jeffrey 2010. Addressing Private Sector Currency Mismatches in 
Emerging Europe. EBRD Working Paper 115. 